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FOREWORD
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates delivered a
remarkable speech at Kansas State University on
November 26, 2007. In his address, the Secretary
underscored the pressing need to greatly expand the
nation’s “soft power” capabilities. Secretary Gates
did not speak at length about current Department of
Defense programs or the need to increase the defense
budget dramatically. Rather, he called for significant
increases in the capacity of other government agencies
to work with the military in the rebuilding of societies
in Iraq and Afghanistan and be prepared to counter
the appeal of international terrorism globally.
Clearly the attack on the World Trade Center and
subsequent conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan
changed forever how Americans think about “national
security.” These events expanded not only the number
and scope of issues, but also the overall complexity
of the process. Consequently, the requirement for
interagency decisionmaking accelerated, demands for
greater policy flexibility increased, and an interagency
process that was largely confined to a few departments
of the Federal Government now involves a multitude
of new players and allied states.
Emerging analysis of the American interagency
and intergovernmental processes has underscored the
nation’s inability to respond effectively and coherently
to contemporary national security demands. The 9/11
Commission and other studies have all recommended
modifications to various organizations and the overall
interagency process. These are clearly required,
but there has not been sufficient attention focused
on the nonmilitary human capital required to meet
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the challenges of the 21st century. Specifically, the
Federal Government lacks a comprehensive process
to ensure the recruitment, development, and retention
of civilian leaders capable of effectively integrating the
contributions of specialized government agencies on
behalf of larger national security interests. This new
security environment requires people who are not only
substantively qualified and knowledgeable regarding
policy issues, but who also possess the leadership
abilities to direct large complex organizations.
This monograph, by Dr. Jeffrey McCausland,
focuses on the human capital required to succeed in
the contemporary national security environment. It
begins with an examination of the multitude of studies
by both government and private agencies concerning
this problem over the past 2 decades. It reviews the
current development programs in three departments of
the Federal Government—the Department of Defense,
Department of State, and Central Intelligence Agency.
Finally, the author outlines a proposal for a National
Security Professional Program to meet this pressing
need.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Future historians will undoubtedly conclude that
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), were a
watershed in American history. The scope and focus of
American national security policy changed forever in a
few hours. America fought major wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq in the aftermath of this historic day. The nation
remains engaged in the daunting challenges of postconflict stability operations and the creation of effective
governance in both countries. These efforts will likely
continue for many years, and similar challenges may
arise. America in the 21st century is more threatened
by failing states that are a breeding ground for terrorist
movements than by the imminent attack by a hostile
peer competitor.
Some important lessons have emerged about
this new security environment even as the “war on
terrorism” continues both in America and around the
globe. First, policymakers must remain engaged with
challenges that predate the 2001 terrorist attacks such as
globalization, international trade, the spread of AIDS,
etc. They must, however, view these problems through
a new lens and confront other emerging challenges.
Furthermore, this condition is not temporary. The
nation must expect that the threat of multiple crises
will continue indefinitely. Finally, the challenge of
international terrorism cannot be effectively confronted
solely by the use of military force. It is fundamentally
important that American national security strategy
emphasizes the effective integration of all elements of
national power—political, diplomatic, and economic,
as well as military.
These events of the first decade of the 21st century
have changed how Americans must think about
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“national security.” They have dramatically expanded
not only the number and scope of issues, but also the
overall complexity of the process. Americans who felt
safe at home and viewed security threats as distant
from our shores no longer feel this way. Consequently,
the requirement for interagency decisionmaking has
accelerated, demands for greater policy flexibility have
increased, and a process that was largely confined to a
few agencies of the Federal Government now involves
a multitude of new players and allied states. Clearly,
the sad and apparently unexpected aftermath of the
Iraq War underscores the critical need for significant
changes in the planning of military operations,
preparation for post-conflict requirements, and
oversight of their execution.
As the nation embarked on this new era, the
2002 National Security Strategy noted that we must
“transform America’s national security institutions
to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st
century.” The Bush administration responded initially
with the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, representing the largest change in the structure of the Federal Government since the National
Security Act of 1947. But we must also transform
existing institutions, the policy process, and how we
“think” about the defense of the nation. Furthermore,
as General Richard Myers, former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed, this transformation
cannot wait—“it must take place as we wage the war
on terrorism.”
Yogi Berra was once asked by a sportswriter
while he was serving as the manager of the New
York Yankees what was the most important thing in
developing a world championship team. Berra replied
instantly, “Hire world championship players.” While
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this is true in sports and private enterprise, it is equally
important in government. If America is to meet the
multiple challenges of the 21st century, it is crucial that
we develop a system that places the right people in the
right places in government at the right moment. The
nation critically needs civilian policymakers who can
manage change and deal with the here and now. This
monograph examines the development of career civilian leaders for strategic decisionmaking in the national
security policy process. Such development must include
the recruitment of quality personnel, experiential
learning through a series of positions of increasing
responsibility, training for specific tasks or missions,
and continuous education that considers both policy
and process. Consequently, it requires people who are
not only substantively qualified and knowledgeable
regarding policy issues but also possess the leadership
abilities to direct large complex organizations.
This analysis considers existing efforts in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), State Department,
and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and provides
appropriate recommendations for each. It also outlines
the changes required to existing personnel management systems and development programs to create an
effective cadre of civilian national security professionals for the policy process. Clearly, these recommendations may be applicable for other executive agencies as
well. These three departments were selected because
they have traditionally had the primary (if not exclusive)
role in the development of foreign and defense policy.
There are also obviously growing requirements
for those with technical expertise, human resource
management, finance/comptroller skills, etc. The
development of personnel with these talents for these
three agencies is not the subject of this monograph.
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Certain assumptions are crucial to this analysis.
First, it is critical to understand that the words “training” and “education” are different when considering
human capital development. Training is concerned
with teaching what to think and what the answers
ought to be. Education is focused on teaching how to
think and what the questions ought to be. Training
is most frequently used when the goal is to prepare
an individual or an organization to execute specified
tasks. It often includes task repetition, not unlike an
athletic team learning to execute plays, and normally
is the preferred method of learning when the goal is
to perform operations in which success, failure, and
completion can be clearly measured. Education has
more to do with how to think about problems and how
to deal with challenges that may not lend themselves
to outright solutions. It is a matter of intellect, thought,
indirect leadership, advice, and consensus building.
Second, we must also differentiate between
“leadership” and “management.” Management is
about coping with complexity. It is a response to a
significant development of the 20th century, namely
the emergence of large, complex organizations. Good
management brings order to what would otherwise be
chaos. Leadership, by contrast, is about coping with change.
Management remains important for the day-to-day
success of any organization and focuses on such issues
as planning/budgeting, organizing/staffing, and
controlling/problem solving. By contrast, leadership
begins with setting direction and aligning people, as
well as motivating them to success. The successful
development of government policy for the war on
terrorism wholly depends upon developing leaders
of substance at all levels of executive agencies. They
must be able to balance the pressing requirements of
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management with the critical need to provide their
organizations, and the collective effort, leadership.
Problems with the recruitment, retention, and
development of individuals for the national security
process are not new. The last 20 years are replete with
studies led by leading American policymakers or think
tanks, U.S. Government Accounting Office Reports,
congressionally directed studies, and even presidential
directives. They have focused on a single government
agency, the interagency process, or government
service in general. These studies demonstrate that
problems associated with the recruiting, retention, and
development of the “best and the brightest” for a career
as a civilian in the national security process are not new.
Furthermore, they demonstrate that this problem has
taken on increased saliency in the last decade and in
particular in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. It is also
interesting to note that many of their recommendations
are remarkably similar. Many stress the growing need
for greater developmental opportunities, lateral entry,
required rotational assignments to other agencies, etc.
Finally, this litany of reports is a sad testimony to the
Federal Government’s inability to adequately confront
this issue despite its growing importance.
Still, some critics will argue that the nation is at
war and can ill-afford reorganizations or changes at
this critical moment. The sad tragedy that has been
the Iraq War would suggest otherwise. It became
clear almost immediately following the invasion
in 2003 that fundamental errors had been made in
intelligence and policy analysis. From the very onset,
the United States not only required additional troops
for the occupation of Iraq, but also enhanced civilian
leadership and capacity to reconstruct Iraqi society.
Without both these components, efforts to forestall
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the ensuing chaos, as well as the resultant insurgency,
were doomed to failure. The historical record since
2001 is replete with studies and analyses that clearly
show the pressing need for a better synergy of efforts
by the various agencies of the Federal Government to
confront challenges of establishing effective regimes in
both Baghdad and Kabul.
As American patience wears thin over the failure
to achieve clear success in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
the argument might be presented that this has been a
tragic aberration. Once the United States withdraws,
it can avoid future efforts to rebuild societies torn
apart by conflict. Unfortunately, this global conflict
will not allow us that luxury. We are confronted by an
enemy who would replace secular governments with
theocratic regimes hostile to our national interests and
values. Their strategy amounts to “a global series of
insurgencies, competing for the right to govern” in
many predominantly Muslim nations around the
globe. State collapse will continue to challenge the
national interests of the United States and its allies
for decades to come. If we are to prevail, we must
mobilize and synchronize all elements of our national
power—diplomatic, military, economic, social, and
informational—to confront these new and extremely
dangerous adversaries. The key actions required in a
counterinsurgency involve “work we associate with
civilian skill sets and even agencies—but the uniformed
military is often placed in the position of having to
undertake such activities.” Consequently, a rebalancing
of roles between military and civilian leaders is
required. Regardless of what the final outcome is in
Iraq, it may not be our past so much as our future. This
new security environment requires better qualified
career civilian leaders to think in different patterns in
order to accomplish these daunting tasks.
xii

DEVELOPING STRATEGIC LEADERS
FOR THE 21st CENTURY
INTRODUCTION
It is remarkable how the scope and focus of
American national security policy have changed since
September 11, 2001 (9/11). The United States has
fought two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and
is engaged in the daunting challenges of post-conflict
stability operations in both countries. The “war on
terrorism” continues both here in America as well as
throughout the globe. Policymakers remain engaged
with the challenges of globalization, international
trade, the spread of AIDS, etc., that predate the 2001
terrorist attacks. Now, however, they must view these
problems through a new lens and confront emerging
challenges with Iran and North Korea. Finally, these
conditions are not transitory—the nation must expect
that the threat of multiple crises having an immediate
effect on American security will continue indefinitely.
The old adage that Washington is “a one crisis town”
can no longer apply.
These events have changed how we think about
“national security.” They have dramatically expanded
not only the number and scope of issues, but also
the overall complexity of the process. Americans
who felt safe at home and viewed security threats as
distant from our shores no longer feel this way. The
government that is supposed to protect us has also felt
the winds of change. The requirement for interagency
decisionmaking has accelerated, demands for greater
policy flexibility have increased, and a process that
was largely confined to a few agencies of the Federal

1

government now involves a multitude of new players
and allied states. Clearly, the sad and apparently
unexpected aftermath of the Iraq War underscores the
critical need for significant changes in the planning
of military operations, preparation for post-conflict
requirements, and oversight of their execution.
As the nation embarked on this new era at the turn
of the century, the 2002 National Security Strategy noted
that we must “transform America’s national security
institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of
the 21st century.”1 The Bush administration responded
initially with the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security, the largest change in the structure
of the Federal government since the National Security
Act of 1947. But we must also transform existing
institutions, the policy process, and how we “think”
about the defense of the nation. Furthermore, as General Richard Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, observed, this transformation cannot wait—”It
must take place as we wage the war on terrorism.”2
Crucial to this effort is developing a system
that places the right people in the right places in
government at the right moment.3 The nation critically
needs civilian policymakers who can manage change
and deal with the here and now. This monograph will
examine the development of career civilian leaders
for strategic decisionmaking in the national security
policy process. Such development must include the
recruitment of high-quality personnel, experiential
learning through a series of positions of increasing
responsibility, training for specific tasks or missions,
and continuous education that considers both policy
and process. Consequently, it requires people who are
not only substantively qualified and knowledgeable
of policy issues, but also possessed of the leadership
abilities to direct large complex organizations.
2

This monograph will first consider existing efforts
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), State
Department, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
then make appropriate recommendations for each. It
will further consider what changes must be made to
existing personnel management systems and development programs to encourage the creation of an effective cadre of civilian “national security” professionals
for the policy process. Such recommendations may be
applicable to other executive agencies as well. These
three departments were selected since they are in
many ways those with a clear traditional role in the
development of foreign and defense policy. Clearly,
there are additional considerations with respect to
current and growing requirements for those with
technical expertise, human resource management,
finance/comptroller skills, etc. The development of
personnel with such talents for these three agencies
will not be the subject of this monograph.
Some critics might observe from the outset that the
nation is at war and can ill-afford reorganizations or
changes at this critical moment. The sad tragedy that has
been the Iraq War would suggest otherwise. It became
clear almost immediately following the invasion in 2003
that fundamental errors had been made in intelligence
and policy analysis. From the very beginning the
United States not only required additional troops
for the occupation of Iraq but also enhanced civilian
leadership and capacity to reconstruct Iraqi society.
Without both these components, efforts to forestall the
ensuing chaos as well as the resultant insurgency were
doomed to failure.4
Poor civilian leadership and mismanagement
have been clearly documented in numerous studies,
books, reports, and articles.5 Official reports provided
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by Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), are particularly critical
of American efforts in Iraq. In early 2007, SIGIR
reported that despite nearly $108 billion budgeted
for the reconstruction of Iraq since 2003, the country’s
electricity output and oil production were still below
prewar levels. Stocks of gasoline and kerosene had
actually plummeted to their lowest levels in at least 2
years.6 Consequently, Mr. Bowen testified before the
Senate Judiciary Committee in March 2007 that his office
planned to “aggressively pursue” the suspension and
prosecution of contractors who are determined to have
engaged in fraudulent contracting activities in Iraq.7
He further observed that the failure of the Americanfinanced reconstruction program in Iraq threatened to
be repeated elsewhere unless structural changes were
made in the U.S. Government. Mr. Bowen compared his
recommendations to the Congress as not dissimilar to
proposals made in the 1980s that resulted in legislation
strengthening the Joint Chiefs of Staff.8
Prior to this, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) noted in its
comprehensive report in late 2006 that “civilian agencies
also have little experience with complex overseas
interventions to restore and maintain order—stability
operations—outside of the normal embassy setting.”9
The ISG described the mission in Iraq as “unfamiliar
and dangerous.” As a result, the report observed that
the United States had great difficulty filling civilian
assignments in Iraq with sufficient qualified personnel.
The ISG recommended that the constituent agencies
(State, Defense, the U.S. Agency for International
Development [USAID], Treasury, Justice, Intelligence
community, etc.) train for and conduct joint operations
across agency boundaries. It further suggested that the
State Department expand its efforts to train personnel
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to carry out civilian tasks associated with such complex
stability operations, concluding that a Foreign Service
Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide
surge capacity for such operations be established.
This effort should provide a model for other civilian
agencies to include Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture.
Such ideas, however, were hardly new. They had been
recommended a year or more prior to the release of
the ISG report by leading government experts and
officials.10
As American patience wears thin over the failure
to achieve progress in Iraq the argument might be
presented that this venture has been a tragic aberration.
Once the United States withdraws from Iraq, it can
simply avoid future efforts to rebuild societies torn
apart by conflict. Unfortunately, this global conflict
will not allow us that luxury. We are confronted by
an enemy who would replace secular governments
with theocratic regimes hostile to our national interests
and values. Their strategy amounts to “a global series
of insurgencies, competing for the right to govern”
in many predominantly Muslim nations around the
globe.11 State collapse will continue to challenge the
national interests of the United States and its allies
for decades to come. If we are to prevail, we must
mobilize and synchronize all elements of our national
power—diplomatic, military, economic, social, and
informational—to confront these new and extremely
dangerous adversaries. The key actions required
in a counterinsurgency involve “work we associate
with civilian skill sets and even agencies—but the
uniformed military is often placed in the position of
having to undertake such activities.”12 Consequently,
a rebalancing of roles between military and civilian
leaders is required. Regardless of what the final outcome is in Iraq, that outcome may not be our past so
5

much as our future. This new security environment
requires better qualified civilian leaders to think in
different patterns in order to accomplish these daunting
tasks.
TERMS
Understanding certain assumptions is crucial to
this analysis. First, some observers may take exception
to the distinction between the words “training” and
“education.” They may argue that they are synonymous,
as we frequently use them interchangeably. They
are not the same, there being a significant denotative
difference. While training is more concerned with
teaching what to think and what the answers ought to
be, education is all about teaching how to think and
what the questions ought to be: “Training is focused
on the development and performance of specific
tasks or skills, and education is oriented toward more
generalized and abstract knowledge that may or may
not be tied to specific tasks or action.”13 Training is
most frequently used when the goal is to prepare an
individual or an organization to execute specified
tasks. It often includes repetition of tasks, not unlike
an athletic team learning to execute plays. Finally, it is
normally the preferred method of learning when the
goal is to perform operations in which success, failure,
and completion can be clearly measured. Education has
more to do with how to think about problems and how
to deal with those things that may not lend themselves
to categorical solutions. It becomes a matter of intellect,
thought, indirect leadership, advice, and consensus
building.
Second, we must also differentiate between
“leadership” and “management.” Management is about
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coping with complexity. It is a response to a significant
development of the 20th century, namely, the emergence of large, complex organizations. Good management brings order to what would otherwise be chaos.
Leadership, by contrast, is about coping with change. An
expert in human development once wisely observed,
“If you don’t like change, you will like irrelevancy even
less.” American business recognized this phenomenon
as competition in the market and volatility in business
cycles became more intensive and jarring. Doing the
same thing only slightly better was no longer good
enough. Management remains important for the dayto-day success of any organization, focusing as it does
on such issues as planning/budgeting, organizing/
staffing, and controlling/problem solving. By contrast,
leadership begins with setting directions, aligning
people, and motivating them to achieve success.14 The
successful development of government policy for the
war on terrorism is wholly dependent upon developing
leaders of substance at all levels of executive agencies.
They must be able balance the pressing requirements
of management with the critical need to provide
leadership for their organizations and the collective
effort.
These expanding requirements for improved
leadership and management preceded 9/11, and
remain an integral part of dealing with the rapid
pace of change. In his widely acclaimed book, The
Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman described
the importance of change in the international system
along with the corresponding demands placed on
both organizations and individuals. He argued that
“Globalization” had replaced the Cold War as the new
defining international system.15 But “the globalization
system, unlike the Cold War system, is not frozen, but
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a dynamic ongoing process.”16 Friedman observed
that “if the Cold War were a sport, it would be sumo
wrestling.” Quoting Professor Michael Mandelbaum,
he continued: “It would be two big fat guys in a ring,
with all sorts of posturing and rituals and stomping of
feet, but actually very little contact, until the end of the
match, when there is a brief moment of shoving and
the loser gets pushed out of the ring, but nobody gets
killed.” Globalization, by contrast, “would be the 100meter dash, over and over and over. And no matter
how many times you win, you have to race again the
next day. And if you lose by just one-hundredth of a
second, it can be as if you lost by an hour.”17
In this new environment, any program that places
“the right people, in the right place, at the right time”
must acknowledge that it seeks to develop policy
substance as well as management and leadership in
its workforce to confront the changes engendered by
globalization and the new security environment. If the
policy process is to be improved, it must have wellqualified policymakers who understand the issues.
Many must also develop into leaders as they move
through their careers. These future leaders must be
able to set goals, inspire performance, and monitor
progress for the success of their organizations and the
overall process.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Problems with the recruitment, retention, and
development of individuals for the national security
process are not new. The last 20 years are replete with
studies conducted by leading American policymakers,
think tanks, U.S. Government Accounting Office
(USGAO) Reports, Congressionally-directed studies
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(such as The 9/11 Commission Report), and even
presidential directives that focused either on a single
government agency (the most studied appears to be
the Department of Defense [DoD]), the interagency
process, and government service in general. For
example, the National Commission on the Public
Service was formed in 1987 following a symposium
entitled, “A National Public Service for the Year 2000.”
The symposium concluded that a “quiet crisis” existed
in government. Too many of the nation’s best senior
executives were prepared to leave government, and
not enough of its most talented young people were
prepared to join.18
The commission, headed by former Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker, included 36
distinguished Americans including former presidents,
senators, congressmen, cabinet-level officials, corporate
executives, university presidents, and leaders of
major nonprofit organizations. Former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld served as a member of
this commission. The commission uncovered wide
dissatisfaction among those in senior and mid-level
positions of government. For example, only 13 percent
of the senior executives interviewed by USGAO as part
of the effort said they would recommend that young
people start their careers in government. The report
embraced three themes that shaped its findings—
leadership, talent, and performance. It recommended
making more room at senior levels of departments
for career executives, enhancing efforts to recruit
quality young people, and more effective executive
development. In this last area the report observed,
. . . the education of public servants must not
end upon appointment to the civil service.
Government must invest more in its executive
9

development programs and develop stronger
partnerships with America’s colleges and
universities.19

It further recommended increases in compensation
and a reduction in presidential political appointees by
1,000 in order to create room for more career civilians
to advance.
In May 1997, the Clinton administration issued
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56. The directive
acknowledged that the federal government requires
the capacity to prepare agency officials for the
responsibilities they will be expected to assume in
planning and managing agency efforts for complex
contingency operations. It further noted the need to create a “cadre of professionals” familiar with this integrated planning process to improve the government’s ability to manage future such operations. It was issued at
a time when the Dayton peace enforcement mission
in Bosnia that had been predicted to last 1 year had
become an open-ended operation with no end in sight,
and when many in the Clinton administration were
still feeling the effects of the bitter lessons from the
Somalia.
PDD 56 directed the State Department, Defense
Department, and the National Security Council to work
with the “appropriate U.S. government educational
institutions—including
the
National
Defense
University, the National Foreign Affairs Training
Center, and the U.S. Army War College—to develop
and conduct an interagency training program.”20
It further directed that this training effort be held at
least annually and focus on the development of midlevel managers (Deputy Assistant Secretary level)
in the preparation and implementation of political/
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military plans for complex contingency operations.21
A. B. Technologies reported in a study prepared for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff that “the spirit and intent of PDD
56 directed training is not being followed” and that as
a whole the directive was not implemented.22
The need for a cadre of professionals to deal with
the emerging security environment was reiterated
in December 1997 with the issuance of the National
Defense Panel Report. This report recommended the
creation of “an interagency cadre of professionals,
including civilian and military officers, whose purpose
would be to staff key positions in the national security
structures.”23 The panel argued that this cadre should
be similar in spirit to the “joint” products envisioned
by the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Act. Their report made
the following specific recommendations:
• create personnel management systems to
provide greater attention to the education,
development, and career development of these
personnel,
• identify “interagency” slots within the national
security community including domestic
agencies that have foreign affairs responsibilities
(e.g., Justice, Commerce, and Energy) which are
staffed by this interagency cadre, and
• establish a national security curriculum,
combining course work at the National Defense
University and National Foreign Affairs
Training Center.24
In 1999 the Clinton administration convened the
Panel on Civic Trust and Responsibility. This group
prepared a report entitled “A Government to Trust and
Respect” that, sad to say, identified many of the same
problems that had been highlighted 10 years before.
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The panel reported that in 1960 20 percent of law
school graduates nationwide worked for the Federal
Government at some point during their first 10 years
of employment, with 35-40 percent of those having
received a Masters in Public Administration (MPA). At
roughly the same time, between 1,200 and 1,500 young
Americans applied for the 39 positions available as
part of the White House Fellows Program. By 1999,
however, there were only 300 applicants for White
House fellowships. Schools of Public Administration
were sending percentages of their graduates in the low
teens to Washington, and the law schools were sending
only about 13 percent.25
The report found that Americans remained proud
of their country, but they were deeply concerned and
distrustful of their government. Furthermore, the
public was not willing to invest significantly higher
levels of trust and confidence in the government until
they perceived improvements in the way decisions
were made. The study urged improvements in the
quality of public officials to be achieved through greater
leadership appeals in behalf of public service with the
hope of attracting the “best and the brightest.” It further
recommended higher standards for government
performance, improvements in the technological tools
provided government civilians, and formation of
public-private partnerships for enhancing government
performance.
At nearly the same moment, Paul Light, Director
of the Brookings Governmental Studies program,
presented his report entitled, “The New Public Service”
(1999). The Light Study argued that a flexible range
of government, private, and non-profit opportunities
had begun to replace traditional government-centered
public service. In 1974, for example, 76 percent of the
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graduates of major public administration or public
policy graduates schools took their first jobs in the
government sector; 11 percent took private sector
jobs; and 12 percent went to nonprofit organizations.
In 1993, 49 percent went to government positions;
23 percent went to the private sector; and 24 percent
to non-profits. These numbers continued to drop
between 1993 and 1999. While there is a multitude of
reasons for this phenomenon, Light concluded that
three were paramount: (1) recent graduates believed
they had a better chance to help people in the private
sector or working in non-profit organizations; (2)
they also believed the private and non-profit sectors
managed money more wisely than government; and
(3) these graduates believed their opportunities for
professional advancement and personal growth and
skill development were far better in the non-public
sector work place.26
Light observed that the public servant of the 21st
century wants and expects to change jobs and sectors
frequently. Young people are not solely focused on
job security and salary but rather on getting a job
with a tangible impact. Overall, he concluded that the
government system falls short in recruiting, training,
and management. The study recommended that the
government:
• Declare a human capital crisis, recognizing it is in
a talent war with the other sectors;
• Be more aggressive in recruiting mid- and upperlevel positions from the outside;
• Recognize that recruitment must be followed with
challenging work and the opportunity for
growth.
This effort also uncovered two interesting
demographic phenomena in the civilian government
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workforce. First, Light concluded that the career civil
service faced the potential for a steady stream of
retirements at a rapid rate through 2014. A managing
partner of the Andersen Consulting firm quoted by
Light described this situation as a “human-capital
time-bomb ticking.” For example, approximately 40
percent of the career Senior Executive Service (SES)
force became eligible for early or regular retirement by
2003, and almost 70 percent qualified by 2006. In DoD
the figures were 64 percent already eligible, and 74
percent eligible in 2005. Second, the federal hierarchy
was shifting from a traditional bureaucratic pyramid
into an ellipse or diamond. The year 1998 marked
the first time in history that the number of middlelevel federal employees outnumbered the lower-level
employees. A decade ago there were 1.2 lower-level
employees (General Schedule 1-10) for each middlelevel employee (General Schedule 11-15). Only a year
later, the lower-level number had dropped to 0.93 for
every middle-level position. If this trend continues,
the federal government’s last front-line employee will
retire sometime in 2030, with his or her job having been
contracted out or downsized forever.27 Obviously, these
changes will have serious impacts on the education and
development of both senior policymakers and civilian
agencies in the future.
In 2000 two reports focused solely on this issue in
DoD. The first was the Defense Science Board report on
the Task Force on Human Resources Strategy of that
year. It noted a “growing shortage of managers in place
to fill career positions that . . . become available as more
than half of the civilian workforce becomes eligible to
retire in the next 5 years.” The report concluded with
the following critical issues for the civilian workforce
in the DoD:
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• Insufficient number of properly trained candidates
in the pipeline, an aging workforce with little
turnover, limited professional development
opportunities, and weak compensation and
incentive systems for SES and career civil
service.
• Lack of a continuing professional development
program for most career civilian employees.
• Need for an integrated personnel management plan
that includes planning for an increased use of
personnel from the private sector.
• Continuing problems with the confirmation cycle,
inadequate compensation, financial disclosure rules,
and post-employment restrictions, all tending to
create a limited, less qualified applicant pool.
The second report in 2000 was that of the USGAO
titled “Human Capital: Strategic Approach Should
Guide DoD Civilian Workforce Management.” This
report noted that strategic human capital planning
has been a weak link in the management of federal
departments and agencies. It further concluded that:
High performance organizations in the public and
private sector have come to recognize that people
are an organization’s key assets. It is through the
talents and dedicated work of staff that missions
get accomplished.28

The USGAO report further observed that DoD
was like other federal departments and agencies that
are required to deal with the myriad social, economic,
and technological changes that have become de rigueur
in 21st century America. This report was particularly
relevant in that it encompassed over 700,000 civilians
or 37 percent of all nonpostal civilian federal workers.
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Furthermore, DoD had also largely been the “bill
payer” for government-wide civilian reductions
since 1989. Between 1989 and 1999, DoD reduced its
civilian workforce by about 400,000 positions, from
approximately 1,117,000 to 714,000, a 36 percent
reduction.29 Reductions continued until early 2005,
totaling 41 percent. As a result, the DoD civilian
workforce aged from 41.6 to 45.8 years, leaving fewer
employees today in their 20s and 30s. This raises
serious questions about the department’s ability to
replace retirees in the future of whom (as previously
mentioned) 74 percent had reached retirement eligibility by 2005. For example, employment in the youngest age groups, under-31 and 31-to-40, declined 76 percent and 51 percent, respectively, during the period 1989
to 1999. Still, the largest reductions occurred in clerical positions and blue-collar wage grades while the
smallest reductions (8 percent) were in the professional grades GS-9 through SES. As a result, the professional force encompasses a higher percentage of the
workforce and in general is better educated. In many
ways, the civilian workforce in executive departments
of the federal government has evolved over the past
several decades from one qualified by early “training”
to one needing “educational development” today.
Finally, this report pointed out serious issues with
the actual conduct of personnel reductions. First, it
discovered that civilian force reductions (unlike those
on the military side) were less oriented toward shaping
the makeup of the workforce in the future. Little
attention was paid to maintaining a balance of skills
needed to maintain in-house capabilities as part of
the defense industrial base. Second, little concern was
paid to the fact that the resulting workforce would be
significantly older and thus more retirement eligible.

16

Third, many senior officials voiced concerns that the
reductions had adverse effects upon the morale of the
residual workforce. They observed that in many cases
these changes resulted in limited career development
opportunities, reduced chances for promotion, job
insecurity, and longer working hours.30
The USGAO report concluded that a five-part
framework is essential if DoD is to create an effective
human capital management process. The five parts are
as follows:
• Strategic planning—Establish the agency’s
mission, vision for the future, core values,
goals, and strategies.
• Organizational alignment—Integrate human
capital strategies with the agency’s core
business practices.
• Leadership—Foster a committed leadership team
and provide reasonable continuity through
succession planning.
• Talent—Recruit, hire, develop, and retain
employees with the skills needed for mission
accomplishment.
• Performance culture—Enable and motivate
performance while ensuring accountability
and fairness for all employees.
The USGAO report further concluded that a
strategy for human management must include “an
effective approach to ‘growing leaders’—identifying
employees with leadership promise and providing
them with a variety of professional development and
learning opportunities designed to pass along the
values and competencies that the agency has identified
as important to its leaders.”31
Since 1990 the USGAO has also periodically
reported to Congress on operations across the entire
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federal government that it identified as being at
“high risk.” This effort is supported by the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House
Committee on Government Reform.32 It has brought a
much needed focus to problems that were perceived as
impeding effective government and wasting money.
In responses to recommendations from these reports,
Congress has enacted a series of government-wide
reforms to strengthen financial management, improve
information technology practices, and instill a more
results-oriented government.
The “high risk” report that was issued in January
2001 at the start of the new Bush administration
included a section entitled “Strategic Human Capital
Management: A Government-wide High Risk Area.”
This report noted that “the federal government has
often acted as if people were costs to be cut rather than
assets to be valued,”33 arguing that the federal government’s human capital strategies were not adequate to
meet the emerging needs of the nation. As a result,
the USGAO warned that the inattention to human
management strategies had created a government-wide
risk that was fundamental to the federal government’s
ability to function effectively. This risk had arisen for
a number of reasons. First, the dramatic downsizing of
the federal government that had occurred during the
1990s was set in motion without sufficient planning for
the overall effect on individual agencies’ performance
capacity. Second, during this time agencies attempted
to save on workforce-related costs by reducing
investments in other human capital investments
such as training and professional development. This
occurred despite the fact that these programs were
critical if their smaller workforces were to compensate
for institutional losses in skills and experience.34
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The 2001 “high risk” update further argued that
the inadequate human capital strategies would have
serious future implications in a number of ways.
Personnel turnover at top management positions would
complicate efforts to transition to modern performance
management techniques. The report observed that 45
percent of career SES members across all agencies and
departments of the federal government were projected
to retire by fiscal year 2005. An additional 26 percent
would become retirement-eligible by that time but
were expected to remain in their existing positions.
This would obstruct attempts to invest in training and
development of younger rising personnel to meet the
specific needs of individual agencies.
This report highlighted as a particularly critical
need that of focusing better on training personnel in
contract management. It argued that agencies must
have more personnel properly trained in contract
management particularly “where agencies must . . .
oversee the quality, cost, and timeliness of products and
services delivered by third parties.”35 This point was
all too prescient in view of the revelations concerning
problems that have bedeviled the American use of
contractors during recovery/reconstruction operations
in Iraq.
The Commission on National Security for the 21st
Century—more commonly known as the Hart-Rudman
Commission after its two chairs, former Senators Gary
Hart and Warren Rudman—was created in 1998 to
conduct a comprehensive review of national security
for the newly emerging era. Enjoying the support of the
Congress and White House, it was originally chartered
by the Secretary of Defense to conduct what was
called “the most comprehensive review of American
security since the National Security Act of 1947.”36 This
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endeavor resulted in three reports by the spring of 2001.
The first, New World Coming: American Security in the
21st Century, focused on the emerging global security
environment for the first 25 years of the new century.
The second, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for
Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, outlined a
new national security strategy that reflected emerging
challenges. The final report, Roadmap for National
Security: Imperatives for Change, offered a prescription
for a significant overhaul of the structure and processes
of the American national security establishment.
This final report by the Hart-Rudman Commission
noted a critical need for reform within the government
personnel system, echoing many of the findings of
the studies previously mentioned. For example, the
Hart-Rudman commission observed that the United
States was “on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of
competence in government.”37 This was due in large
measure to problems that had been identified by the
National Commission on the Public Service in 1987, i.e.,
recruiting, developing, and retaining America’s most
promising talent. While specific recommendations with
respect to the State Department, OSD, and the CIA will
be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections, it
is important to note here the commission’s emphatic
conclusion:
If we allow the human resources of government to
continue to decay, none of the reforms proposed
by this or any other national security commission
will produce their intended results.38

The Hart-Rudman Commission report was significant
for several reasons. First, it remains the most recent
comprehensive review of the federal government,
long-term threats, and strategy. Second, the report
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was amazingly prescient in many important respects.
The findings of this report and its recommendations
thus remain salient despite the fact that the report was
completed before the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
Also at the time of the arrival of the Bush
administration in January 2001, Dr. Robert Moffit of
the Heritage Foundation produced a study entitled
“Taking Charge of Federal Personnel,” which
examined the balance between federal employees,
political appointees, and contractors.39 Many regard
this study as the blueprint for the approach to
personnel management adopted by the newly arrived
administration of President Bush. Moffit argued that
those who seek to reform government “have little
appreciation for the immense power and political
sophistication of the federal employee network and
its allies and the intensity of its resistance to serious
change.”40 Moffit argued that his analysis of past efforts
to improve the federal bureaucracy demonstrated that
a President must (1) make liberal use of his power of
appointments and do so in a timely fashion; (2) use only
political appointees for implementing the President’s
policies and for making all key management decisions;
(3) provide a clear rationale for any reductions in the
size of the federal work force and work to reform the
benefits program provided to federal employees; (4) use
the Civil Service Reform Act to improve accountability;
and (5) make every effort to use good management and
contract out government services to save money.41
Critics have argued that the report viewed
the government bureaucracy as an obstacle to the
administration’s new agenda. The report makes no
recommendations with respect to improving the
career civilian workforce for executive positions. It
clearly argues for “smaller government” and use of
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the private sector to provide many of the services
and expertise that had traditionally been part of the
career civil service in the federal government. Moffit
further recommended that party loyalty should take
precedence over expertise when selecting officials.
Clearly many of the ideas argued in the report were
adopted by the Bush administration such as reform of
the civilian personnel system in DoD (to be discussed
later). There is no doubt this study served to encourage
the new administration to adopt a dramatic increase
in outsourcing and contracting to reduce costs while
providing the government with outside expertise.42
These measures were accomplished in many cases
while reducing the overall number of civil servants.
As a result, government contracts have soared during
the Bush administration to about $400 billion in 2006
from $207 billion in 2000. An analysis prepared by
the New York Times suggests that fewer than half of
all contract actions are now subject to full and open
competition. In 2005, 48 percent were competitive,
down from 79 percent in 2001. Executive agencies,
according to the Times, are unable to seek low prices,
supervise contractors, and intervene when work goes
off course because the number of government workers
overseeing contracts has remained constant or been
reduced, while contract spending has skyrocketed.
These problems were illustrated in October 2007
by a special audit of State Department contracts with
DynCorps for private security guards conducted by the
Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR). The audit
reported that until early 2007 the State Department
had only two government contracting officers to
oversee contracted work by as many as 700 DynCorps
employees. The SIGIR report stated that this shortage
resulted in “an environment vulnerable to waste and
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fraud.”43 Stuart Bowen, Chief of SIGIR, observed
during an interview that “when you put two people
on the ground to manage a billion dollars, that’s pretty
weak.”44
Some observers believe that the trend towards
increased use of contractors has resulted in their having
too great a voice in the actual determination of policy.
The Acquisition Advisory Panel appointed by the
Congress and White House in late 2006 reported that
this trend “poses a threat to the government’s longterm ability to perform its mission” and could over
time “undermine the integrity of the government’s
decisionmaking.” This conclusion was echoed by
David Walker, Comptroller General of the United
States. He observed that the problem ultimately was
a matter of loyalty—”the duty of loyalty to the greater
good—the duty of loyalty to the collective best interest
of all rather than the interests of a few. [Contracting]
companies have duties of loyalty to their shareholders,
not the country.”45
Interest in government human capital adjustments
became more apparent in the aftermath of 9/11. The
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (often referred to as The 9/11 Commission
Report) observed that the federal government’s
interagency process was unable to adapt how it
manages problems to the new challenges of the 21st
century, explaining that:
The agencies are like a set of specialists in
a hospital, each ordering tests, looking for
symptoms, and prescribing medications. What
is missing is the attending physician who makes
sure they work as a team.46
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The report charged that a missing element contributing
to the 9/11 disaster was effective management of
transnational operations.47
Even prior to the final release of The 9/11 Commission
Report, the Center for Public Service at the Brookings
Institution established its National Commission on
the Public Service. The Commission was composed
of Chairman Paul A. Volcker and 10 distinguished
Commissioners. They included former Comptroller
General of the United States Charles Bowsher; former
U.S. Senator Bill Bradley; former Secretary of Defense
Frank Carlucci; former White House Chief of Staff
Kenneth Duberstein; former Office of Personnel
Management Director Connie Horner; former Office
of Management and Budget Director Franklin Raines;
former head of the New York Metropolitan Transit
Authority Richard Ravitch; former Treasury Secretary
Robert Rubin; former Secretary of Health and Human
Services Donna Shalala; and former Congressman
Vin Weber. Their report, Urgent Business for America:
Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century,
was issued in January 2003. The Commission
underscored the urgent warnings contained in
the Hart-Rudman Commission Report, calling for
immediate action in a number of areas. These included
improvements in federal personnel management
practices and a concerted effort to recruit and retain
employees for the federal government.48 It further
called for (1) reform of the presidential appointment
process to include a reduction in the overall number of
Executive Branch political appointees; and (2) careful
examination of competitive outsourcing practices to
ensure they did not undermine core competencies of
the government.49
That same year USGAO conducted a study of how
and whether agencies in four countries—Canada,
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Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—
are adopting a strategic approach to managing the
succession of career civilian senior executives and other
public servants who have critical skills. This study,
entitled Human Capital: Insights from Other Countries
Succession Planning and Management Initiatives, was
delivered to Congress in September 2003.50 The study
observed that:
leading public organizations here and abroad
recognize that a more strategic approach
to managing human capital should be the
centerpiece of any serious change management
initiative to transform the cultures of government
agencies.51

It concluded that several key practices were used
by agencies in these nations to deal with succession
issues and overall human capital management. They
included (1) ensuring that the top leadership of the
agency or department actively participates in planning
for succession and other management initiatives; (2)
linking this effort to the organization’s overall strategic
planning; (3) identifying talent (particularly with
critical skills) at multiple levels in the organization
and early in employees’ careers; and (4) emphasizing
developmental assignments in addition to formal
training.52 Obviously, these efforts in democratic nations
outside the United States are consistent with many of
the recommendations contained in the various studies
and analyses commented upon above, all of which
are focused on the goal of protecting and enhancing
organizational capacity.
In the summer of 2004, the RAND Corporation
published a broad examination of the career
development strategies of three U.S. employment
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sectors—government, private corporations, and notfor-profit organizations. It concluded that “America’s
ability to shape the world this century will depend
on the quality of its leaders,” but that the nation was
producing too few future leaders with sufficient depth
and broad international experience.53 The two authors,
Gregory Treverton and Tora Bikson, conducted over 135
interviews of leaders in all three sectors. They observed
that while all three sectors had major problems, the
federal government was the most striking in its failure
to address practices that were contrary to attracting
and developing future leaders. The report did find,
however, that a new sense of urgency had emerged
in the aftermath of 9/11, and that young people were
attracted by the opportunity to serve.
Treverton and Bikson concluded their study with
several recommendations, many of which echo those
made by previous such studies and reports. They
include (1) making the hiring process quicker and
more transparent; (2) requiring individuals to serve
rotational assignments in other government agencies as
a requirement for promotion; (3) facilitating temporary
movement of officials from one department to another
as required; (4) developing mechanisms for the lateral
entry from other sectors (business or nonprofits) to fill
mid-career positions; (5) expand targeted fellowship
programs particularly at the graduate level to nurture
talent; and (6) reserve some number of senior positions
(particularly at the deputy assistant secretary level) for
career civil servants to encourage retention.54
In late 2005 the federal government launched
“Project Horizon,” designed to bring together U.S.
Government senior executives from agencies with
global responsibility and the National Security Council
(NSC) staff to explore ways to enhance interagency
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coordination. This effort, which embraced nearly every
department and agency of the federal government,
was funded/managed by the participants with active
involvement from the NSC. The Executive Summary
of its initial progress report, released in the summer of
2006, states that the department participants identified
the building of “a more flexible and deployable corps of
U.S. Government professionals with deep interagency
experience and global affairs expertise” as critical to the
government’s ability to deal effectively with the current
operational environment.55 The report concludes with
10 discrete interagency capabilities needed to deal
with anticipated challenges and opportunities. Two
are particularly relevant to this monograph. First, a
revised set of human resource policies, procedures,
and incentive structures was needed to facilitate the
rapid assembly of capable, experienced, and integrated
personnel. These changes were essential to create a
“global affairs career path” that would include required
interagency rotations/training, formal education, and
provisions for flexible assignments and deployments.
Second, a network of global affairs training institutions
was needed, one that mutually leveraged member
curricular offerings to create an enhanced curriculum
for the development of global affairs professionals.56
Project Horizon is now exploring possibilities for
institutionalizing appropriate curricular offerings as
found through quarterly meetings of an interagency
strategic planning group (ISPG).57
Obviously, this brief review of studies, reports,
directives, etc. with respect to recruiting, retention,
and development of career civil servants for the
national security process over the past 20 years is not
comprehensive. There are many other studies that
focus on an individual agency or department, or on an
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aspect of the problem.58 Still the 15 documents treated
here have many points in common. First, they show
that problems associated with the recruiting, retention,
and development of the “best and the brightest” for a
career as a civilian in the national security process are
not new. Second, they demonstrate that this problem
has taken on an increasing urgency in the last decade
and in particular in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11.
Third, many of the recommendations converge, e.g.,
greater opportunities for development, lateral entry,
required rotational assignments, etc. Finally, this litany
of negative reports is sad testimony to the federal
government’s refusal or inability to adequately confront
these issues despite their growing importance.
A TALE OF THREE AGENCIES
The following three subsections examine how
three agencies—State, OSD, and CIA—currently
develop career civilian leaders for participation in
the national security decisionmaking process and
then makes specific recommendations that apply to
each, respectively. As previously suggested, such
development must include the recruitment of quality
personnel, experiential learning through a series of
positions of increasing responsibility, training for
specific tasks or missions, and continuous education
that considers both policy and process. But if change
characterizes the environment that descended upon
America after 9/11, do the cultures of these three
organizations facilitate or retard change and growth?
To answer this question, in the sections that follow
we shall undertake a compact review of each of their
cultures with respect to the professional development
of its members.
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“Organizational culture” is a powerful force within
any organization or group. It is concerned with group
norms or traditional ways of behaving that any set of
people develops over time. Organizations, like people,
have a past as well as a future. Such group norms
are not solely recurring behavior patterns that can be
observed by outsiders, but are those actions, attitudes,
and assumptions that are unconsciously reinforced
by everybody in the organization.59 Frequently these
accepted actions might even be counter to what
is printed as organizational policy. Something is
“cultural” when, if a member does not behave in the
normal manner, the others (or the organization itself)
automatically nudge him or her back towards the
accepted ways of doing things. As a result, “culture”
will triumph over “planning” every time. Any effort
focused on organizational growth that fails to consider
culture is doomed from the outset. Clearly, the CIA,
OSD, and State reflect this phenomenon; consequently,
any improvement must include appropriate alteration
of their respective culture, or what we might think of
as group norms.
Indicative of these group norms was a survey
of members of the SES conducted in August 1999 at
roughly the same time as the Hart-Rudman
Commission deliberations. This survey was sent to
all Senior Executive Servants throughout the federal
government, numbering over 6,500. Approximately
2,500 (40 percent) responded. Among the significant
findings:60
• Over 75 percent oversaw a budget in excess of
$1 million.
• Two out of three reported rewarding teamwork,
creativity, and innovation.
• Most believed creativity and innovation were
rewarded though subordinates did not share
this belief.
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• The most important core qualifications for
them were leadership, communications, focus
on results, leading change, and technical
competence.
• Many believed that recruiting more leaders
outside the Federal Government for career SES
positions would improve the SES.
• Over half believed a rotation assignment to
another agency would be a positive developmental experience, but only 9 percent had been
afforded the opportunity.
• Most had to do any personal development on
their own time as it was not offered as part of
their formal development.
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have placed new
requirements on executive agencies to play a role in
post-conflict resolution that many were ill-prepared
for. In many ways, these conflicts have forced the leaders in these agencies to confront fundamental aspects
of their organizational culture. In the aftermath of the
attacks of 9/11, many senior officials have pointed to the
difficulty of getting executive agencies to adopt a war
mentality, an indication of both the problem and power
of organizational culture. Former Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld was repeatedly quoted as believing that the
majority of the federal government was not at war. He
also took the view that the demands placed upon these
agencies were frequently beyond what they had been
trained, organized, and equipped to accomplish.61
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Department of State.
It is a badge of honor among Foreign Service
Officers to avoid any education once they join the
department.
—A Senior Foreign Service Officer

The Department of State has perhaps the most
unique culture of the three agencies in several ways.
First, Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) normally enter
the organization with a graduate degree and frequently
with some familiarity in foreign language. Most are
nearly 30 years of age and frequently have already had
a previous career. Consequently, they are normally
somewhat older than their colleagues entering OSD
and CIA. Second, the values of the institution reveal
much about its culture. The State Department’s core
values include loyalty to the United States, character
that exhibits the highest ethical standards, and
excellence in service. All of these underscore the State
Department’s representational function abroad and
requirement to provide assistance to Americans and
businesses abroad.
This representative function leaves little time for
development of a core competency for the organization.
FSOs view themselves as focused on performing the
various functions required at an embassy or developing
policy. The majority of FSOs serve a significant portion
of their career in a core area such as political officer,
economics, consular services, information management,
etc. Unlike the military that “trains” and “prepares
for operations,” FSOs view themselves as continually
conducting generic diplomatic functions week after
week. Consequently, long-term planning is rarely put
forth as a core competency of the organization.
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Finally, the remaining organizational values
emphasize accountability/individual responsibility
and a sense of community that includes teamwork
and the customer-service perspective, both of which
are essential to the functioning of an embassy. As a
result, the State Department has largely eschewed the
tendency to focus the development of its officers on
a particular regional background but rather sought
“generalists” who are fungible and thus deployable
worldwide. Most FSOs measure the ultimate success of
their respective career by whether they are ultimately
selected for an ambassadorial position. This perspective
has traditionally discouraged specialization in a
particular region or culture since the pool of prospective
ambassadorial positions remains worldwide in scope.
A strong difference exists, however, between
the denizens of “Foggy Bottom” in Washington and
those serving in overseas assignments. The fact that
the latter venue is the clear preference of the majority
of FSOs reflects in many ways the historical ethos
of the organization. Moreover, promotions in the
organization seem to favor those who achieve their
success overseas. Consequently, most FSOs seek to
stay in regional bureaus or abroad and avoid functional
agencies (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, arms
control, legislative affairs, etc.) despite the fact that
these organizations are not only critical to the success
of the institution but also provide valuable experiential
learning opportunities. This status difference may
also result in bifurcation within the organization. For
example, the economics section of State may be more
closely aligned with Treasury or the Office of the
Trade Representative on a particular issue than with
the regional bureaus. This organizational tendency
often results in poor integration of goals between
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regional and functional policies, and a lack of sound
management, accountability, and leadership.62
Another essential value of the culture is that
individual performance trumps group effort by
a division or directorate. Recognition is often the
derivative of having your “name on the byline” of an
important cable to Washington. Consequently, rotation
assignments outside State are acceptable but not truly
encouraged, particularly as an individual becomes more
senior in rank. Most believe such assignments are illadvised as it rarely affords them sufficient recognition
within State to undergird subsequent promotions. This
belief is also due in part to the long narrative format
for State Department evaluations and a corresponding
fear that few outside the culture will fully understand
it. The department has begun an effort to coordinate
many of its personnel policies with USAID, a major
component of State, and encourage rotations between
the two, but it remains to be seen whether this move
will be truly embraced by the organization.
Finally, the FSO community has been the most
successful of the three organizations in ensuring that a
number of its career diplomats are placed in Assistant
Secretary or even Undersecretary positions as new
administrations arrive. There was even a grievance
leveled by the FSO association against an administration
when a particular position that had been traditionally
held by an FSO was given to a political appointee.
Ultimately, the decision was reversed. State has also
occasionally been successful in placing career FSOs in
senior positions in OSD that had normally been held
by political appointees, but there have been few, if any,
examples of a career OSD person being offered a senior
position at State.
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From the overall standpoint of recruiting, retention,
and culture, the Hart-Rudman Commission observed
in 2001 that the State Department, “in particular, is a
crippled institution, starved for resources by Congress
because of inadequacies, and thereby weakened
further.”63 The commission went on to state that
only if these internal weaknesses were cured, would
State become an effective leader in the formulation
and conduct of policy. Such cures were critical to
securing necessary funding from Congress. This was
highlighted in the summer of 2000 when 1,400 Foreign
Service personnel (roughly a quarter of the entire FSO
corps) attached their names to an Internet protest of
their working conditions.64
The challenges to the State Department brought
about by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were
perhaps greater than to any other organization in the
federal government. The Hart-Rudman Commission
had suggested even prior to 9/11 that the capacity
of the department to support post-conflict resolution
efforts had deteriorated and was insufficient to meet
an explosion of requirements. One need only consider
that in 1950 the budget of the Department of State was
roughly half that of DoD. By 2001 it was only 1/20th.
During the Vietnam War, USAID had nearly 15,000
employees. By 2001, this number had been reduced to
roughly 3,000. As a result, Secretary of Defense Gates
has described USAID as essentially an “outsourcing
and contracting agency.”65 The total number of FSOs
was only 5,000 in 2000. Even prior to 9/11, the number
had not increased significantly despite the fact that
the number of countries and international institutions
requiring diplomatic representation had grown
significantly in the years following the end of the Cold
War.
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This record is particularly stunning if one compares
State to DoD. In 2007 the U.S. defense budget
accounted for approximately half of total global
defense spending, and American armed forces had
over 1.5 million uniformed personnel. By comparison,
the State Department employed 6,000 FSOs (a 1,000
increase from 2000), while USAID employed 3,000. In
other words, by 2007 DoD was about 167 times the size
of the State Department (including USAID). As one
observer noted, “There are substantially more people
employed as musicians in Defense bands than in the
entire U.S. Foreign Service.”66 President Bush himself
seemed to underscore the pressing need for a greater
civilian effort in post-conflict recovery efforts during
his State of the Union Address in January 2007. The
President expressed his desire to “design and establish
a volunteer Civilian Reserve Corps.” This corps would
function much like military reserves and ease the
burden on the military by allowing the government to
hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions
abroad.67 So far, at least, this effort is at best in the
embryonic stage, and a full-scale effort is unlikely prior
to the end of the Bush administration.
The challenge posed by Iraq for the State Department
was underscored in President Bush’s “Surge Speech”
on January 10, 2007. In his remarks to the nation, the
President outlined a new strategy for Iraq that included
a 30,000-soldier increase in military forces deployed to
Iraq as well as a doubling of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) and the better integration of their efforts
with brigade combat teams.68 This PRT increase was
proposed despite the fact that maintaining staffing even
in existing PRTs in Iraq had been a significant challenge,
with frequent turnovers and lengthy vacancies. The
results of PRTs have been neither surprising nor
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impressive. The Initial Benchmark Assessment Report
released on July 12, 2007, noted that while the military
had been able to achieve the targeted increase in troop
deployments by early June, the expansion of the PRT
program was still not complete with only about half
of the approximately 300 additional PRT personnel
having been deployed by that date. The report noted
that “the full complement of civilian surge personnel
will be completed by December 2007” (emphasis
added).69 Some might plausibly argue that taking
nearly 1 full year to increase civilian deployments by
300 is hardly a surge. In fact, a very senior Pentagon
official remarked that he had greater confidence that
the Iraqi government would deliver on its promise
to provide additional military forces for security in
Baghdad than that the State Department would be
able to deliver on its planned PRT increase to meet the
expanded requirements as outlined in the President’s
surge strategy.70
For a number of years the State Department had
been unable to recruit sufficient new FSOs to replace
those departing owing to normal attrition. This was
due in part to budgetary restrictions. Consequently,
by 2002 there were 25 percent fewer people taking
the entrance examination than in the mid-1980s.
The opportunity to live abroad, learn a foreign
language, and develop negotiating skills which had
traditionally attracted young people to the Foreign
Service were now available in the private sector and
many nongovernment organizations (NGOs). These
competitor organizations offered higher salaries,
lacked the level of austerity or danger often faced
by State Department employees, and imposed fewer
constraints on two-career families.71 There was also
some indication that attrition itself might be a growing
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problem. While most Foreign Service entering classes
have suffered an attrition rate of 12 to 17 percent by the
eighth year of service, two classes in 2000 and 2001 had
sustained 23 and 32 percent, respectively, by the same
point in their careers. While these results were not
conclusive, they were supported by two major studies
on departmental talent by McKinsey and Company as
well as the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel.
The department’s own policies had also been
a detriment to attracting and retaining the best
personnel. The recruiting process was slow, and
candidates frequently waited 2 years from the date of
their first written exam until the first day of work. The
required oral exam also discouraged many qualified
people from applying, particularly if they had a broad
range of knowledge as opposed to specific skills. This
distinction was compounded by the exam’s antiquated
“blindfolding” policy whereby the examiners (who
determined which applicants were offered positions
in the Foreign Service) often knew nothing about the
individual’s background. While this procedure had
the admirable goal of ensuring a level playing field
for all applicants, it ran completely counter to the
need to recruit the most qualified individuals.72 As of
March 2003, this process had been eliminated for the
individual assessment portion of the exam.
Upon assuming his responsibilities as Secretary of
State, Colin Powell quickly enunciated his desire to
enhance recruitment and the development of FSOs.
Secretary Powell observed:
For America . . . leadership begins and ends
with having the best men and women in the
Department of State. It is absolutely imperative
that on the front lines of freedom, democracy,
and open markets we have men and women who
are excited about the possibilities and superbly
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talented in orchestrating and managing the
kaleidoscope of changes that colors our todays
and brightens our tomorrows.73

Consequently, the Department began the “Diplomatic Readiness Initiative” in FY2002. The initiative
was a 3-year plan to hire 1,158 staff over and above
attrition. It was hoped that this would ensure that the
department could respond to crises and emerging
priorities, cover gaps, and provide employees
appropriate training/development. The program
focused on entry-level positions, disallowing lateral
entry at higher levels (for example, GS 12-14). An
Alternative Examination Program was initiated,
allowing applicants (limited to government employees)
to advance to the oral examination on the basis of their
professional experience.
By 2004 the department had redressed almost the
entire personnel deficit of the 1990s and increased
diversity and quality of FSOs and specialists.74 The
Department dramatically increased its investment in
marketing, expanded outreach efforts, and student
programs. As a result, applicants for the Foreign
Service examination doubled from about 8,000 in FY
2000 to nearly 20,000 in FY2004. Candidate refusals
of job offers from State plummeted from 25 percent
in FY2000 to 2 percent in FY2004, while the quality
of those hired in terms of academic background and
critical skills improved significantly.75 By 2007 State
Department officials proudly announced that, for the
second consecutive year, the department had been
placed in the top five ideal employers in an annual poll
of undergraduates reported by Business Week.76 Still,
despite these laudable successes the department was
only able to stabilize its overall strength at a total of
roughly 5,500 FSOs. It was unable to create a significant
surge capability.
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Efforts were also made to redress what had been
a difficult relationship between the State Department
and USAID, while at the same time expanding USAID’s
capacity to deal with complex international emergencies and post-conflict resolution issues. The administration established the President’s Management Agenda
to ensure that both organizations maintained wellqualified and well-trained workforces. This included
a USAID Development Readiness Initiative to increase
surge capability, joint training, and the establishment
of formal Department-USAID cross assignments, etc.77
Still, these remained largely voluntary programs and
were never adequately resourced.
In February 2004, Senators Richard Lugar, Joseph
Biden, and Chuck Hagel introduced the Stabilization
and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act
(commonly referred to as the Lugar-Biden Initiative).
This legislation sought to establish a more robust
civilian capacity to respond quickly and effectively to
post-conflict situations as well as complex international
emergencies. An Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created
in the Department of State, but its work to improve
planning and coordination was largely undermined
by a lack of resources that drew criticism from a
number of sources.78 In response, President Bush
signed National Security Presidential Directive 44,
titled Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning
Stabilization and Reconstruction, in December 2005,
but the NSC Deputies Committee did not approve
the interagency management system to commence
serious planning across the government until March
2007. Currently, the S/CRS consists of only 70 experts.
After 3 years of effort, it has trained 11 active members
for deployment and an additional 300 Standby Corps
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volunteers.79 The recurrent concern about the shortage
of funds for S/CRS was reiterated by the Secretary of
State in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in February 2007.80
In January 2005, Dr. Condoleezza Rice assumed
her new role as Secretary of State. She took control
of the department as it was continuing to undergo
rejuvenation based on the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative created by her predecessor, and she
subsequently endorsed this effort. One year later, she
outlined her vision for the department, which was
described as “transformational diplomacy.”81 Dr. Rice
argued that American diplomacy must now seek to
“create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous
world.” To accomplish this grand task, she outlined
three management objectives:
• Reposition personnel, particularly from the
European epicenter of the Cold War, to dispersed and linguistically/culturally difficult posts
that are home to emerging powers as well as
problems.
• Shift the professional focus from a reporting role
to managing programs and building institutions
with a special emphasis on public diplomacy.
• Expand training, especially in difficult languages, and require senior FSOs to maintain functional expertise in two languages and regions.82
The Secretary also announced her commitment
to expanding the capabilities of State’s S/CRS that
had been created by former Secretary Powell and
endorsed by the Biden-Lugar Initiative. Following
the announcement of the new plan, legislation was
enacted transferring $100 million DoD funds for postconflict operations to S/CRS to empower it for critical
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situations.83 Still, as previously noted, many experts
argued that at least $400 million or more annually was
required if S/CRS was to be adequately resourced.84
Finally, Secretary Rice used the word “transformational”
to describe her belief that “like any great changes of
the past, the new efforts we undertake today will not
be completed tomorrow.” She described this effort as a
“work of generations.”85 Consequently, this endeavor
was aimed at altering the organizational culture of the
department as it had developed throughout the Cold
War, obviously not an overnight task.
During the initial year of this effort, Secretary
Rice also sought to overhaul the department’s hiring
process. State Department Director General George
Staples stated that under the plan announced in
December 2006 the department would use a new
“Total Candidate” approach.86 The goal would be to
improve the department’s ability to find and compete
for the best candidates and improve the overall hiring
process. The effort would weigh resumes and references
in making hiring selections but would also consider
intangibles such as “team-building skills.” The written
examination for candidates would be retained but
shortened and automated.
This effort occurred against the backdrop of
expected personnel losses due to retirement and
increased competition with the private sector and other
government employers for top-quality personnel. The
Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit organization
based in Washington, estimated in 2007 that 60 percent
of federal workers would reach retirement age in the
next decade. In the State Department it is estimated that
90 percent of senior officers will be eligible for retirement
in the next 5 years. Overall, State’s civil service cohort
has aged from an average of 41 in the 1990s to 47 in FY
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2006.87 Streamlining of the department’s recruiting and
hiring process was thus timely.
Criticisms of changes in the hiring process were
largely based on two arguments. First, many career
FSOs openly expressed their concern that the changes
would lead to a politicization of the selection process.
Some pointed at the earlier expanded use of contractors
as a clear attempt to introduce political correctness
into the policy process, and they interpreted the latest
changes as a complementary effort. Second, even
proponents had to agree that the written examination
had been a proven predictor of candidate success.
Consequently, many viewed the change to automated
format as a lowering of standards for entry.88
Secretary Rice requested additional resources in
her initial year in office for her transformation effort
but remarkably did not request a significant increase
in subsequent fiscal years. The 1,000-plus positions
that were added as part of the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative have now been absorbed by assignments
to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other difficult positions in
Washington and around the globe. An independent
assessment of the Secretary’s “transformational
diplomacy” effort suggested the department needs
a minimum of 1,000 additional trained officers just
to meet existing requirements.89 This was further
corroborated in the report, The Embassy of the Future,
prepared by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in October 2007. This study describes how
the State Department by its own analysis has a
shortage of 1,079 positions for transit, training, and
temporary needs (these include language training,
professional education, rotational assignments, etc.).90
The report further outlines the need for joint agency
training, rotational assignments to other departments,
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educational opportunities at universities, and further
leadership training as essential to accomplishment of
the State Department mission in the future.91
The issue for the Department of State is not solely
one of shortages in personnel and resources, as
difficult as those challenges might be. Many experts
have also argued that in addition to expanding overall
strength, the Department of State must better protect
its developmental resources, including leadership/
management programs, from personnel “raids” to cover
operational emergencies. One report suggested that
“sending people abroad without the requisite training
is like deploying soldiers without weapons.”92
The department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI)
describes itself as the federal government’s primary
training institution for officers and support personnel
of the American foreign affairs community. It annually
provides more than 450 courses, including instruction
in 70 languages, to more than 50,000 employees from
the State Department, over 40 other government
agencies, and the U.S. military.
As part of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,
some efforts were made to enhance developmental
opportunities for FSOs offered at FSI and elsewhere.
Mandatory courses in basic, intermediate, and
advanced leadership for employees at the level of GS
13, 14, and 15 (Foreign Service grades 03, 02, and 01,
respectively) were established, as well as the Senior
Executive Threshold Seminar for those recently
selected for senior Civil and Foreign Service.93 Career
candidates for Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission
(DCM) appointments have an advantage if they have
demonstrated leadership qualities. Unfortunately, the
four required courses total only 17 days, of which 2 are
equal opportunity and diversity awareness. The Senior
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Executive Seminar, 3 weeks in length, is somewhat
more robust. Overall, training offered at FSI expanded
by 25 percent from 1.9 million student classroom hours
to 2.4 million from 2002 to 2004.94
Still, many of these courses are primarily “training”
as opposed to “education.” Furthermore, the FSI
reports to the Undersecretary of State for Management,
whose duties include security, human resources,
building operations, and administration, rather than to
those departmental leaders responsible for the future
direction of the institution as well as overall policy.
Consequently, many of the courses offered are focused
primarily on preparing a diplomat or his/her family
to be successful in a particular assignment abroad.
They do not provide broad-based education on policy
or problems that do not lend themselves to textbook
solutions.
Consequently, the State Department offers little
in the way of formal education and development for
its officers during their career. Most current FSOs are
forced to learn either experientially or by their own
outside efforts. There are individual developmental
opportunities to attend the military’s senior service
colleges or participate in such programs as congressional fellowships. Unfortunately, these are not formalized development programs for the organization, not
numerous, and not perceived as career enhancing due
to the long period of separation. These impediments
are compounded by manning shortages, which mean
that there is frequently no officer available to fill a
position for an educational or development experience
for an extended period.
With these points in mind, several recommendations specific to the State Department seem appropriate. First, a successful Foreign Service requires
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officers who are consistently building new knowledge
and skills. The State Department requires a 1015 percent increase in personnel to allow for that
proportion of the overall service to be in training or
education at any given moment. This number must
be rigorously fenced off solely for these purposes to
allow for adequate training and development. Failure
to do so will result in personnel being simply absorbed
into ongoing operational efforts. Second, expanding
requirements and the pressing need to maintain a
surge capacity require more flexibility for admission
to the Foreign Service. Horizontal entry and exit
should be considered whereby those with a particular
background or linguistic skill could enter laterally
at grades far above entry level. Furthermore, greater
allowances should be made for career FSOs to take a
leave of absence for personal reasons and subsequently
return to duty. Third, any use of “blindfolding” for
selection to the Foreign Service should be ended, and
overall recruiting practices reviewed.
Fourth, the Alternative Examination Program
should be broadened to include those in the military
(both active and reserve) or who complete graduate
degrees in areas of particular need. Fifth, control of
the FSI should be passed from the Undersecretary of
Management and placed directly under the Deputy
Secretary. This shift would give FSI greater prominence,
underscore the importance of FSO development, and
allow the department leadership to better control course
offerings and selection policies. Sixth, opportunities for
development assignments at think tanks, congressional
staffs, military war colleges, etc., should be actively
sought as part the department’s overall development
programs. Seventh, critical problems exist with respect
to pay, allowances, and retirements. FSOs serving in
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Iraq and Afghanistan pay taxes while serving abroad,
unlike uniformed military, and effectively take a
pay cut during these assignments. Foreign Service
retirement is capped, and, unlike the military or other
government agencies, State Department retirees cannot
accept another government position without forfeiting
a significant portion of their retirement pay. These
compensation issues must be addressed.
Finally, the Hart-Rudman Commission made one
final internal recommendation for the State Department
in 2001 that still deserves consideration. The report
recommended changing the Foreign Service’s name to
the United States Diplomatic Corps.95 Some might argue
that this is superficial rhetoric mongering, but it could
have a significantly beneficial impact. It would serve
as a reminder that this group of people do not serve
foreign interests but are rather central to U.S. national
security. Such a change would further rationalize the
value of diverse assignments in regional bureaus,
abroad in an embassy, and in the functional components
of the organization. This change might help to better
depict a career pattern for young people considering
diplomatic service as a possible profession. Finally,
it would also serve to emphasize that the traditional
mission of the State Department to provide national
representation abroad has dramatically changed, as
revealed in the recent report The Embassy of the Future.96
This report observes that diplomats of the future will
need traits and skills that are different from those of
diplomats a decade ago and even those hired today.
A change in organizational culture is required, as the
“new diplomat must be an active force in advancing
U.S. interests, not just a gatherer and transmitter of
information.”97
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Office of the Secretary of Defense.
I have had 2 days of formal development in
my 30 years as an OSD employee . . . 1 day of
AIDS awareness and 1 day of sexual harassment
training. . . .
—OSD Senior Executive Servant

As an organization, that portion of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that deals with policy
differs significantly from State and CIA. First, it is a
smaller group of professionals, numbering only about
400. In fact, they are outnumbered by others within OSD
(human resource management, finance, comptroller,
acquisition, research/development, etc.). Second, the
State Department has a focused competency in diplomacy, and the CIA deals with intelligence gathering
and analysis. OSD Policy shares its competency in
defense planning with the military to a degree but
is primarily focused on the security relationships
between the United States and foreign powers.
Obviously, this focus changed dramatically when, in
the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, DoD assumed
responsibility for the initial efforts at post-conflict
resolution instead of the Department of State. Third,
development of an official within OSD primarily deals
with his/her substantive background on a particular
policy question as opposed to broad understanding
of national security policy, the interagency process, or
any effort to develop the skills necessary to manage a
large and complex organization.
As previously discussed, the Defense Science
Board Report of the Task Force on Human Resources
and the USGAO report (“Human Capital: Strategic
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Approach Should Guide DoD Civilian Workforce
Management”) both pointed out many of the existing
problems in DoD. They include insufficient numbers
of properly trained candidates in the pipeline, limited
professional development opportunities, weak incentives/compensation plans, an aging workforce, etc.
The department overall suffered the largest force
reductions in its history at the end of the Cold War,
resulting in a professional staff that views itself as
largely over-tasked. Fewer personnel have not resulted
in fewer requirements, particularly in the aftermath
of the attacks of 9/11. Despite this fact, reductions
in personnel strength that were planned prior to
these tragic events remained “on the books” to be
implemented.
For the middle to upper grades, some believe that
DoD recruiting has benefited markedly in the last few
years by the change in the dual compensation laws that
affected military officers upon retirement. These now
allow military professionals upon retirement from
active duty to accept government positions without
any reduction in their retirement compensation.
While this step has offered the department a source
for recruiting mid-level management with significant
policy experience, it may have masked or even
contributed to the longer-term problem of an aging
workforce. This problem could be exacerbated if
coupled with the absence of a robust recruiting
program. Over time, this might cause the OSD policy
community additional problems due to the impending
retirement of a significant portion of the staff. It may
also, if not managed effectively, lead to a perception
among younger employees that their opportunities
for progression are inhibited by the lateral entry of a
significant number of military retirees.
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Still, the overall job satisfaction in OSD and
Defense agencies is relatively high, similar to what is
found in the private sector. Civilian job satisfaction is
somewhat lower for those assigned to the service staffs
(Army, Navy, and Air Force), but these still exceed 50
percent approvals.98 While this is encouraging, these
professionals give lower ratings to their supervisors
and the quality of work produced than one finds in
similar private sector analysis. This may indicate that
a larger percentage will seek retirement at the earliest
age possible under the existing personnel system.
Overall, DoD does not have an aggressive
recruiting program. For many years, the department
largely depended upon the Presidential Management
Fellows Intern Program for entry-level positions in
policy, but in the aftermath of the Cold War, these
numbers shrank significantly. Proposals were made
prior to 2001 to increase the number of selectees per
year for the coming decade, but they were not acted
upon.99 In November 2003 President Bush announced
the Presidential Management Fellows Program (PMF)
to modernize this effort. The new program sought to
increase standards, rigor, and prestige of the program,
and it lifted the annual hiring cap for all Federal
agencies.100
The PMF program is a paid government fellowship
sponsored by the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) for recent graduate students who seek a 2-year
fellowship in a U.S. government agency. Selection
begins with the nomination of the student by the
Dean, Chairperson, or academic program director of
their graduate program. This is followed by a rigorous
assessment process. Agencies that hire PMFs include
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense,
Education, Energy, Health and Human Services,
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Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation,
Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Library of Congress, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and USAID. Following the
conclusion of the 2-year fellowship, PMFs usually have
the opportunity to convert their fellowship into a fulltime permanent position. In 2007, over 3,900 applicants
were screened, 790 were determined to be finalists, and
383 received appointments.101 Consequently, OSD has
seen some increases in both the numbers and quality of
applicants from the PMF program.
These facts, coupled with OSD’s unwillingness
to actively recruit new employees, could suggest a
problem of organizational culture—a tendency to view
career civilians as replaceable parts versus valuable
professionals who need to be aggressively recruited,
managed wisely, and retained. It appears, however,
that the current generation of young Americans does
see government service in agencies such as OSD as
attractive. For example, since 1997 OSD has received
between 100 and 140 applications each year for the six
to eight open PMI positions.102
Consequently, the federal government should
attempt to eliminate recruitment hurdles and seek
to expand the National Security Education Program
(NSEP, also referred to as the David L. Boren National
Security Education Act) that links educational benefits
to government service requirements. This act directed
the Secretary of Defense to create the program,
provide oversight, and award scholarships. The NSEP
was established in December 1991 with the following
objectives:103
• Provide resources, accountability, and flexibility
to meet U.S. national security education needs,
especially as such needs change over time.
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• Increase the quantity, diversity, and quality
of the teaching and learning of subjects in the
fields of foreign languages, area studies, and
other international fields critical to the Nation’s
interests.
• Produce an increased pool of applicants for
work in the departments and agencies of
the U.S. Government with national security
responsibilities.
• Expand, in conjunction with other Federal
programs, the international experience, knowledge base, and perspectives on which the U.S.
citizenry, government employees, and leaders
rely.
• Permit the federal government to promote the
cause of international education.
Since 1994 the NSEP has awarded over 3,000
undergraduate and graduate scholarships for study
abroad. Each recipient is required to spend 1 year
working in the federal government in a position of
national security responsibility. This is normally
associated with DoD, Department of State, Homeland
Security, or an element of the intelligence community.104
This opportunity seems to be particularly attractive to
those who have recently completed degrees at schools
of public policy and seek entry-level positions/
experience. Efforts might also be considered to create
an ROTC-like program for particularly promising
young undergraduates who are in relevant disciplines
and seek a career in government service.
Experiential learning through rotation assignments
to other government agencies, the National Security
Council, or other outside developmental experiences
are largely discouraged by the OSD culture and
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leadership. Many quality OSD personnel have sought
such assignments in the past and performed brilliantly,
but this was largely due to their own initiative. They
were rarely, if ever, rewarded upon their return with
promotions or positions of increased responsibility. In
the late 1990s, OSD policy created a number of other
professional developmental opportunities at the various
war colleges, State Department, Council on Foreign
Relations, as well as sabbaticals at major universities
for GS 15 or SES-level employees. These were all
largely discontinued with the arrival of Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, and any future assignments outside
of OSD policy could occur only if an assistant secretary
was willing to give up the necessary body. Clearly
these decisions were driven in part by the operational
reality that every OSD employee who was sent to a
developmental assignment outside of the organization
meant that in theory his/her position would remain
vacant until the incumbent returned.
Reluctance may be due to the fact that, in general,
OSD senior positions have a higher percentage of political appointees than commensurate subcomponents
of CIA and State. As a result, the organizational focus
is on the immediate needs of policy as opposed to
the professional health and development of career
employees. The presence of Schedule C or political
appointees in many (if not most) senior OSD policy
positions further discourages career advancement.
Many civilian professionals increasingly see their progress reaching a “glass ceiling” prior to any consideration for a deputy assistant secretary position. Furthermore, many see that they must not only compete
with political appointees for senior positions but
also with senior military officers and even FSOs who
periodically have been offered senior DoD positions.
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This tendency may contribute to earlier retirement or
the loss of valuable employees to the private sector.
Unfortunately, DoD does not conduct exit interviews
for those departing the department as part of its
overall recruitment/retention efforts. Consequently, it
is difficult to assess the relative importance individuals
ascribe to particular factors in deciding to depart
service in the Department.
In the early 1990s, DoD attempted to establish a
more formalized development program. Senior officials
realized that the implementation of the GoldwaterNichols Act had begun to yield an officer corps that
was more highly educated and equipped with a
stronger joint perspective than in the past. There had
not, however, been a similar investment on the civilian
side. Civilian career professionals in OSD had very few
opportunities for developmental assignments and little
exposure to national security decisionmaking. Since
1997, OSD has initiated at least two new programs
focused on enhancing leadership and management
development among its civil servants and expanding
their overall understanding of the policy process—
the Defense Leadership and Management Program
(DLAMP) and Policy Career Development Program
(PCDP).
DLAMP was established partially in response to
the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
Force. It was designed as a systematic effort to prepare
civilians for key leadership positions at GS 14-15 and
SES levels for DoD. It had three components:
• A 1-year rotational assignment outside one’s
occupation or component.
• A minimum 3-month course in professional
military education at the senior level that was
established at the National Defense University.
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• At least 10 advanced graduate courses in subjects
important for Defense leaders (in essence a
DoD-focused MBA program).105
At one time DLAMP had 1,100 participants with 83
enrolled at 10-month professional military education
courses (such as the war colleges).
While this program was endorsed by the Defense
Science Board, it suffered from several difficulties over
time. First, DLAMP was designed for all DoD civilian
employees regardless of background. There was no
distinction between those in technical fields versus those
in policy positions. Those assigned to policy positions
rarely were afforded the opportunity to attend, while
many with a technical background found experiences
such as the senior service college interesting but
somewhat irrelevant to their career patterns. Second,
DoD was unable to generate a personnel delta from
which to fill positions left vacant when individuals
were attending schooling. Consequently, managers
were reluctant to send their best to schooling. As a
result, GS 12s and 13s began being assigned to meet
requirements. Third, selection for attendance was based
on performance and not potential. Administrators
claimed that existing personnel regulations precluded
them for making development assignments based
on future potential, arguing they were forced to
focus solely on improving a person’s background for
their existing position. As a result, no clear link was
established between DLAMP attendance, subsequent
assignments to positions of greater responsibility, or
promotions. Fourth, OSD Policy found DLAMP of less
and less interest as it was more and more successful at
attracting entry level applicants who already possessed
a master’s degree.106 Finally, graduation criteria seemed
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unclear to many based on the three tasks involved,
and this made management of the program more
difficult. This, coupled with rising costs for temporary
assignments and overall mismanagement, resulted in
the program being downsized solely to attendance at
the senior service colleges. In 2007, roughly 50 DLAMP
students are in attendance at the various war colleges.
Significantly, none have been sent from DoD policy
positions.
The PCDP was created specifically to deal with
the development of OSD personnel in policy positions
in the latter part of the Clinton administration. This
effort’s goal was “to develop career national security
professionals of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Policy (OSD Policy) who are motivated, professionally
developed and trained, and during the course of
their careers, increasingly able to shape and affect the
changing security environment.”107 In formulating
PCDP, its authors observed that historically civilian
employees in OSD Policy had very limited career
development opportunities. Consequently, career
advancement as reflected in more responsible, more
senior, and varied assignments was at best episodic and
difficult to predict or plan for. They also noted that this
was not a new phenomenon. Senior Defense officials
had noted an ever increasing need for enhanced career
opportunities and options for professional OSD Policy
personnel in studies completed in 1961, 1978, and 1994.
This last study stimulated the PCDP effort, and it was
formally inaugurated in 1995.108
PCDP had four interlocking elements. These
included: (1) a training/development program; (2) a
rotation process that sought challenging assignments
both inside and outside of OSD Policy; (3) an improved
recruitment and hiring process; and (4) a career
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advancement program.109 The program included
detailed guidance on when and how personnel could
apply for development or rotation assignments as well
as the creation of panels to review applications, monitor
evaluations, and consider subsequent assignments. In
many ways, this program seemed ideally designed
not only to confront existing problems in OSD Policy,
but also as a model that other agencies of the federal
government might consider. Unfortunately, this group
has not met in several years, and the program is largely
moribund.
Secretary Rumsfeld made “transformation” a
centerpiece of his efforts as the new secretary upon the
arrival of the Bush administration in 2001. He observed
in a Washington Post editorial that “transformation
of our military capabilities depends on our ability to
transform not just the armed forces and the way we fight.
We must also transform DoD.”110 Consistent with this
effort, Secretary Rumsfeld chartered a study to examine
joint defense capabilities in March 2003. This report,
The Joint Defense Capabilities Study, was completed in
January 2004. While this was an exhaustive study of
planning, resourcing, and execution, it largely ignored
any changes to DoD personnel practices. The report
provided only a single page on “workforce planning”
and no detailed analysis of its recommendations. It did
note that “workforce development is often reactive to
decisions concerning joint capabilities, rather than being fully considered when those decisions are made.”111
The report concluded that to support a revision in the
planning process effectively, a more systematic effort
had to be made to address human capital requirements.
It recommended two additional efforts: (1) conduct
a careful analysis of personnel requirements and
training; and (2) increase the number of overall experts
available to the department.
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Perhaps in partial response to these recommendations the Bush administration also proposed the
Defense Transformation Act in 2003 that was designed
to assist the department in better managing its
civilian personnel. Secretary Rumsfeld underscored
the importance of this effort to the nation’s security:
“The DoD cannot meet the challenge of the future
with an organization anchored in the past. We must
be permitted to be as agile, flexible, and adaptable
as the forces we field in battle around the world.”112
This effort sought to restructure how DoD hires, pays,
promotes, and disciplines its more than 650,000 civilian
employees. It proposed a new National Security
Personnel System (NSPS) that would: (1) accelerate the
hiring process that at the time took nearly 5 months, (2)
introduce pay-for-performance bonuses; (3) streamline
the promotion process; (4) provide greater flexibility
for DoD senior managers to move personnel rapidly
as required; and (5) facilitate the transfer of as many
as 300,000 jobs then performed by military personnel
to civilians.113 It also proposed new legislation that
sought to reduce the number of labor unions that DoD
had to negotiate with from as many as 1,300 to half
a dozen. Finally, it proposed expediting the firing of
DoD personnel when necessary.
Congress approved NSPS in November 2003. It
required OSD to establish a program office to oversee
the design and implementation of this new system in
partnership with the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM). This effort began in early 2004 and included
six design working groups encompassing over 100
participants from DoD and OPM. Implementation of
the new system began in the summer of 2005 and was
scheduled to be completed over the next 2 years.
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Obviously this new system was controversial.
Supporters emphasized improved hiring and firing,
a $500 million “performance fund” to provide federal
executive incentive bonuses, enhanced collective
bargaining arrangements, moving uniformed personnel
out of positions that could be performed by civilians,
and incentives for risk taking. They also argued that
the NSPS would reduce the department’s need to
turn to contractors for missions abroad. For example,
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, over 80 percent
of civilians deployed to the theater were contractors.
This was due in part to the fact that DoD regulations
at that time precluded the department from moving
its employees quickly. The associated performance
management system was described as the cornerstone
for the program’s overall success. It required supervisors to establish performance goals and expectations in
concert with their employees and provided personnel
management training for supervisors and managers.
Obviously, this requirement could over time enhance
the managerial skills of at least the existing DoD
leadership.
Critics noted that a pay-for-performance system
had proven a failure in the 1970s and 1980s. They also
complained that previous systems to improve the
ability of DoD managers to assess their employees
accurately had failed. Furthermore, assessments of this
type are particularly difficult to conduct for policyrelated positions in comparison to administrative,
clerical, or technical jobs.114 Consequently, some
believed that while the NSPS might be appropriate for
many portions of DoD, it would be less useful to OSD
Policy.
Detractors further argued that overall the new
law provided the Secretary of Defense “sole and
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unreviewable discretion” to implement change over
the objections of OPM, labor unions, and Congress.
Consequently, the Secretary could bypass federal
personnel regulations to hire and promote any persons
who are declared “essential to national security.”115 An
official with the American Federation of Government
Employees (a union representing 200,000 employees)
said reducing OPM’s role would “open the door
for every subsequent defense secretary to tailor the
department’s personnel system to his or her political
tastes.”116 As a result, a coalition of several federal labor
unions has initiated a number of court cases that seek
to halt or modify NSPS.
This new discretionary authority, coupled with
the expanding number of political appointees in DoD
Policy, could actually result in a significant increase in
the use of contractors for policy analysis. If this were
to occur, it is likely that Secretaries would utilize those
“think tanks” that support administration policies
and deprive the policy process of alternative views.
Finally, NSPS does little to nothing to improve the
development of career employees in OSD Policy. While
the enhanced pay system is important particularly with
respect to recruiting and retention, it ignores other
incentives such as educational opportunities, variety
of assignments, etc., that may be more appealing,
particularly to those in policy positions. In response
to these concerns, members of Congress approved an
amendment to the defense appropriations bill for fiscal
year 2008 that would deny funding for key parts of
NSPS. The White House responded that this effort was
“in essence a total revocation” of the new system.117
Not unlike their colleagues in the Department of
State, new policy professionals in DoD are engaged
in interesting work on a vast variety of issues that in
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many ways are more challenging than during the Cold
War. It would be unfair not to note that efforts have
been made to encourage the “best and the brightest”
to seek a career with DoD, and the recent applicant
pools have had outstanding credentials. Programs
have been initiated to allow positions to be shared
that include currently at least one SES billet. There
has also been an attempt to create a few positions for
DoD policy professionals with Regional Combatant
Commands. The question remains whether or not
these efforts will result in a dramatic improvement in
overall development and serve as an incentive for the
retention of the very best in a policy career.
Still, any DoD civilian joining the policy staff is
confronted by a system that largely leaves career
planning and individual development as a matter of
personal responsibility and choice. They are joining
a staff that has at best an ill-defined career pattern,
particularly for those in policy positions. It places little
value on educational development, training, outside
experiential learning, or rotation assignments to
broaden the knowledge of its personnel. This is despite
the fact that most experts would agree that interagency
experience is critical to the development of effective
policy professionals in today’s and tomorrow’s defense
climate.
In addition to the suggestions previously made,
the following internal departmental improvements
would seem appropriate. First, OSD, in concert with
the Department of State, should expand the number
of overseas postings for its personnel at American
embassies and international organizations. Second,
establish a clear rotational program for those working in
regional bureaus at the GS 15 and SES level at the various
regional centers established by OSD (e.g., the Marshall
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Center in Europe, the Asia-Pacific Center in Honolulu,
the Africa Center at the National Defense University,
etc.) This would not only broaden the understanding
of regional issues for these personnel but also improve
the exchange of ideas on policy questions between the
departments and the centers it oversees. Third, revise
the DLAMP and place a career OSD civilian in charge.
A new revitalized program must link the selection of
an individual for training or educational development
to his/her demonstrated performance and potential.
It must further seek to align better attendance and
completion with subsequent assignments to positions
of increasing responsibility. Fourth, establish avenues
for horizontal entry of highly qualified individuals
with particular specialties into senior career positions.
Central Intelligence Agency.
Development in the Central Intelligence Agency
is a Booker T. Washington self-help program. . . .
—Senior Intelligence Officer

At first glance the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) would seem to have the fewest problems of
the three agencies considered in this analysis. In
reality, however, the CIA probably had the greatest
requirement to change in the aftermath of the attacks
of 9/11. At the conclusion of the Cold War, it had the
most concentrated expertise of the three agencies on
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and was still
in the process of redefining its requirements. The
so-called “War on Terrorism” required a dramatic
shift in expertise as the agency sought a rapid
increase in personnel with facility in the Middle East,
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Afghanistan, etc. Furthermore, as one expert observed
in the aftermath of 9/11, the number of “consumers”
of CIA intelligence expanded dramatically. They now
include everyone from policymakers to police chiefs
to combat commanders at the unit level to FBI agents
trying to get a search warrant.118 Finally, the expanded
paramilitary requirements inherent in the “war on
terrorism” require more intelligence officers, with a
broader understanding of policy.
In light of the ongoing war on terrorism and the
mystique perhaps that surrounds the CIA, it currently
has fewer general recruitment problems. The agency
has experienced periodic difficulties due to the time
required to complete security clearance screening of
applicants, not unlike other agencies in the immediate
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The CIA does, however,
appear to take a much more active role in recruiting
than other agencies. It has established student work
programs for undergraduate internships, co-ops, and
graduate studies programs. Periodically, the CIA has
also had difficulties in computer sciences and exotic
language recruitment, but these are outside the scope
of this monograph.
The agency has experienced some difficulties in
retention. This may be due in part to the generational
attitude of many of today’s applicants who expect to
change careers several times during their working
lives. This obviously is not a problem unique to the
CIA. Modifications were also made to the federal
retirement system in the aftermath of the Cold War that
allowed an employee to depart the CIA early and take
what he/she had invested towards their retirement.
Some experts believe this may have encouraged the
premature departure of experienced CIA professionals.
In addition, the “downsizing” of the CIA that occurred
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prior to 9/11 may have also had a longer-term adverse
effect. Initially, this effort was based on attrition, but
this did not yield sufficient reductions. Consequently,
the agency was forced to offer pre-eligible buy-outs to
many senior employees.
This may have had the unintended consequence
of encouraging some of the best qualified to seek a
second career in the private sector. For example, the
practice of contracting retirees for subsequent agency
work greatly expanded in the years following 9-11;
some believe that nearly 30 percent of employees in the
CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) are retirees called
back as contractors. A DO employee can retire, join a
consulting firm that has an existing agency contract,
and resume his/her old job within weeks with a 25
percent increase in salary.119
In many ways, the primary challenge in developing
leaders at the CIA is dealing with its organizational
culture, both externally and internally. The CIA
itself has a unique organizational culture, but it must
be understood that it is also only part of the overall
“intelligence community” (IC) culture that includes the
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency,
FBI, etc. Accordingly, those who have examined
reform of the intelligence community in the aftermath
of 9/11 have noted a need for greater “jointness” or
better understanding by intelligence professionals of
their sister organizations. Reports prepared by the
congressional intelligence committees on the actions
of the FBI and CIA before or in the immediate wake
of the attacks noted that the Director of the CIA (D/
CIA) was “either unable or unwilling to enforce
consistent priorities and marshal resources across the
community.” Furthermore, the D/CIA “could not be
assured that the entire intelligence community would
focus on the war.”120
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Some observers have suggested that the challenges
posed by organizational culture have greatly
complicated efforts to reform and reorganize the
intelligence system that began in earnest with the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004. They note, for example, that any reform of the
intelligence system is complicated by the existence
of “three distinct, stubborn, and largely incompatible
organizational cultures that are poorly balanced:
military intelligence, civilian national security intelligence (mainly CIA), and criminal-investigation intelligence (mainly FBI).”121 During the Cold War, these
cultures had been optimized for different threats.
Military intelligence and the CIA had prepared to deal
with the threats of nuclear war with the Soviet Union
or conventional war in Europe. The FBI’s primary focus
was (and will continue to be) on criminal investigations,
and the agency has resisted blurring that focus by
transforming itself even partially into a national
security intelligence agency. Consequently, any effort
to develop intelligence leaders for the 21st century must
address the pressing need to ensure that future senior
leaders are able to move beyond the traditions and
requirements of their parent organization and achieve
a broader understanding of the requirements and
needs for overall intelligence collection and analysis.
This should not be interpreted, however, as
suggesting that no efforts have been made to enhance
greater “jointness” between the various agencies
comprising the intelligence community or to establish
development mechanisms to address this issue. The
Intelligence Training and Education Board established
a cross-agency team to define common standards for
training, education, and career development. This group
provided its report and recommendations in December
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2005 that outlined common competencies spread over
three levels applicable to the various agencies and their
respective development activities.122
In addition, Ambassador John Negroponte, the
initial Director of National Intelligence (DNI), issued
a directive in 2006 requiring all intelligence officers to
serve tours of duty outside their home agencies prior
to being selected for promotion to the government’s
senior ranks. This directive requires each officer to
spend from 1 to 3 years in a different agency. Further,
it established procedures to ensure that employees
on rotational assignments are not treated differently
than those remaining with their parent organizations
for promotions or subsequent assignments. Ronald
Sanders, the DNI’s director for personnel, commented
that “the objective is to develop a leadership cadre that
can look across all intelligence disciplines, bring all
that together, and try to make some sense out of it for
policymakers.”123
This idea was further endorsed by Ambassador
Negroponte’s successor, retired Admiral Michael
McConnell. McConnell issued his “100 Day Plan for
Integration and Collaboration” upon assuming the
position in February 2007. In this plan, McConnell
designated creation of a culture of collaboration as
focus area number one. He noted that “few transformation efforts have been successful when they did not
address culture, attitudes, and day-to-day behavior.”
The plan’s intent was to advance human resource
programs modeled after DoD’s efforts under the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, integrating the intelligence
community’s workforce by promoting “jointness”
through recruitment, training, exercises, education,
retention, assignments, and career leadership
development.124 In his follow-up report issued in
September 2007, McConnell noted the successful
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implementation of the intelligence community’s
civilian joint duty program. The phased program
requires civilians to complete at least one assignment
outside their “home” agency as a prerequisite for senior
rank. The report further suggested that the joint duty
program will allow intelligence professionals to deepen
their understanding of the inner workings of other IC
agencies and the intelligence community at large. It
also enables them to build and sustain collaborative,
information-sharing networks across the IC.125
Of course, these efforts remain largely in their
infancy. Any authentic embedded change to organizational culture embracing the entire intelligence
community will require continued emphatic action
over a number of years to be ultimately successful.
Furthermore, absent expanded authority for the DNI,
success remains dependent to a large degree on the
active volitional “buy in” of all intelligence agencies.
Internally, the CIA itself is in many ways three
organizations in one—Directorate of Operations
(DO), Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and Directorate
of Science and Technology (S+T). Each directorate is
headed by a deputy director of Central Intelligence;
and the three are very distinct organizations in terms
of mission, personnel development, and promotion
policies. Historically, new intelligence officers are
quickly “stovepiped” in a particular one of these
organizations based on their background. The DO
has a large demand for foreign language ability, the
DI regional expertise, and S+T for engineering and
scientific research specialties. Generally, CIA officers
remain in their directorate for their entire career. Office
directors within these three directorates retain primary
jurisdiction over promotions through the rank of GS
14/GS 15, training, and developmental opportunities
for their subordinates. Branch/Division Chiefs also become involved in these decisions. Senior intelligence
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officers believe that career management is largely left
to the individual, with frequently little assistance by
supervisors or the organization. Interestingly, one
authority close to the situation concluded that the
agency is really not focused on developing “intelligence
officers but rather analysts, engineers, and field
agents.”
The CIA, like State and OSD, has traditionally
discouraged experiential learning through rotational
assignments outside the organization. All senior
intelligence officers interviewed believed that the
organization in past years had even discouraged
officers from seeking an assignment within the CIA but
outside their parent directorate (DO, DI, or S+T). This
was considered detrimental to chances for promotion.
Assignments to other agencies (such as OSD or State),
fellowships, faculty positions at war colleges, etc., were
never considered “career enhancing.” This was due to
concerns about being “out of sight” and therefore “out
of mind” within the parent directorate. Robert Gates
(the current Secretary of Defense) attempted to make
a rotation assignment a prerequisite for selection to
Senior Intelligence Officer when he served as DCI, but
this innovation was subsequently discontinued at the
urging of the directorate heads as unworkable.
Several D/CIAs have attempted in the past to
alter the organizational culture somewhat by the
creation of specialized “centers” such as arms control,
counterterrorism, crimes/narcotics, etc. This effort had
the additional benefit of offering other organizations
such as State, OSD, the military, and especially other
members of the intelligence community (DIA, NSA,
FBI, etc.) rotational positions in which their personnel
could not only make appropriate contributions but also
broaden their understanding of the role of intelligence
in policy formulation. Moreover, these centers have
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given the D/CIAs greater flexibility to influence the
development of personnel in their own organization.
Still, the “best and the brightest” in the CIA have
normally been discouraged from seeking assignments
to these outside organizations, since promotions, other
development opportunities, etc., are controlled by the
three deputy directors who tend to take care of those
closest to their bosoms.
The CIA has an exceptionally robust educational
system as an accompaniment to training opportunities,
which, as previously noted, are controlled by the
heads of the directorates. Newly accepted personnel
attend an introductory training course that lasts about
16 weeks (11 weeks of initial training and a 5-week
interim assignment), depending on their directorate of
assignment. There is a mid-level course that personnel
are encouraged to attend at roughly the 10th year of
service. However, this course is voluntary and viewed
as unnecessary for advancement by most personnel. Its
student body numbers only about 30 per year, and each
student must be nominated by his/her office director
who has had to be willing to accept the temporary loss
of those attending. The National Defense Intelligence
College (NDIC) is a fully accredited institution that
offers a variety of courses and degrees for personnel
assigned to the intelligence community. Many of the
programs are structured to allow participation by
personnel who continue to hold a full-time position
in the organization. The NDIC is, however, primarily
focused on students from the DIA, and some observers
have suggested that in the past CIA students were an
under-represented component of the overall IC student
body.
In February 2002, the agency established the CIA
University at the direction of the DCI. The Sherman
Kent School of Intelligence Analysis is part of the
university and focused on the development of analysts
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for the DI. It has both an Essential Skills Program and
an Advanced Analyst Program. The latter includes
five required courses that focus on a variety of skills
and offers the opportunity for students to select
from a variety of electives. It is designed to provide a
nonmanagerial track for those in the DI seeking to reach
senior intelligence service rank. While these programs
are offered to others in the intelligence community, the
vast majority of the participants are from the CIA.126
CIA University also includes the CIA Leadership
Academy, which offers educational development for
agency professionals in three stages—emerging leaders,
new leaders, and executive development. The initial
stage provides nonmanagerial agency officers (usually
through the rank of GS 12) with leadership knowledge
and skills focused on the intelligence mission. The
second stage is for new supervisors and managers who
are in the first 6 to 12 months of their assignments. It
seeks to sharpen skills that maximize their personal
and unit effectiveness. Most courses are 1 to 5 days in
length and voluntary. As usual, attendance at these
courses is largely, if not exclusively, at the prerogative
of the individual supervisor.
The executive development stage addresses
leadership challenges in the framework of recent
international, domestic, operational, and technical
developments that affect the CIA and the intelligence
community as a whole. Courses are designed for GS
15s and Senior Intelligence Service (SIS) professionals
from all directorates and other representatives from
the intelligence community. This stage includes the
DCI leadership seminar, a year-long program with
participants continuing to do their regular jobs.
Participants in this program attend selected seminars
throughout the year with senior U.S. government
officials and private sector leaders.
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These are important educational and training
developments for the organization, as noted by Wilhelm
Agrell: “If a modern profession is characterized by
the transformation from improvisation and masterapprentice relations to formalized education and training programs, then intelligence analysis has come a long
way.”127 Still, the CIA University and its corresponding
programs are a relatively recent phenomenon, and it
remains to be seen whether they will have a lasting
impact on the development of intelligence officers.
In the past, some CIA organizational improvements
have momentarily resulted from earlier task force
recommendations or consultations with outside
experts who offered sound theoretical constructs for
reform. Unfortunately, however, the conversion of
theory to practice has tended to dissipate once the
recommendations have been delivered and the task
force disbanded. One expert concluded that the field
of intelligence management has been for the most part
ahistorical, with limited and noncumulative knowledge of how its theory should be put into practice.128
The central weakness of the CIA’s developmental
program remains that it is largely voluntary in nature for
courses below the executive development level, which
are nominative. There is no formal correlation between
course participation and enhanced opportunities for
promotions. In fact, some observers have noted, for
example, that never in a senior officer’s entire career
within the DO will he or she be evaluated on the basis
of leadership ability.129 Some officials believe, however,
that the results of recent selection boards indicate at least
anecdotally that a trend in this direction is beginning.
If so, this will over time encourage more employees to
take advantage of developmental programs, but such
an awakening will not occur in the near term. Changing
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existing policies in order to make completion of the
mid-level course or course work at CIA University a
prerequisite for promotions in grade or assignments
of increasing responsibility has been considered
and rejected. This rejection is due to the increased
operational demand created by the war on terrorism.
Such rigid prerequisites would require an expansion
of the organization’s manning in order to generate a
delta of employees to be in full-time development or
educational experiences.
Within the CIA, several changes could be adopted
that would improve development. First, like DoD and
the Department of State, the CIA leadership should seek
additional personnel funding to ensure an adequate
“bench strength” to allow personnel to receive advanced
training and education. Second, the DNI should be
given authority to establish practices throughout the
intelligence community that clearly link training/
education to advancement. This measure should also
establish closer ties between training/education and
advancement. Third, the human resource component
needs to simplify security clearance procedures to
speed recruitment. This step is important not only for
the CIA and the entire intelligence community, but for
almost all federal government recruitment. In 2004, a
report by the Office of Management and Budget found
that the average applicant for a new security clearance
waited 446 days for action. In December of that year
Congress directed that by December 2006 80 percent
of all clearance actions be completed within 120 days.
By February 2007, clearance actions had been reduced
to 205 days, with 350,000 applications awaiting
action.130 Fourth, Congress must consider legislation
not unlike that being promoted by DoD to improve
compensation and align it more closely with the
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private sector. Fifth, the established DNI requirement
for rotational assignments should be expanded, with
all agency members required to serve at least one
2-year assignment in another directorate besides their
own prior to being considered for promotion to GS
15. Positions should also be established at regional
combatant commands that would allow more CIA
officers to apply their skills in post-conflict as part of
military contingency planning. Finally, procedures for
the lateral entry of those with particular language or
other unique skills should be implemented.
THE WAY AHEAD—A NATIONAL SECURITY
OFFICER CORPS
In the entry on the Spanish-American War, 189899, in the Oxford Companion to American Military
History, the word most frequently chosen to describe
the mobilization for and the conduct of this conflict is
“chaotic.”131 While the United States was successful in
its campaign against Spain, it was far from our nation’s
finest hour. There was inefficiency, waste, and even
scandal in the provisioning of troops. Little centralized
planning existed, and there was no centralized
command during the war, with the autonomous
Army bureaus often acting at cross-purposes. As a
result, President McKinley selected a young Wall
Street lawyer, Elihu Root, as Secretary of War with
the authority to reorganize and modernize the War
Department. One of Root’s initiatives was to establish
a rigorous system for the education and training of the
armed forces.
This system was further improved upon by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.132 Goldwater-Nichols
forced the military services to train, educate, and assign
officers in a manner calculated to improve their ability
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and willingness to operate jointly. It also established
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) with Joint
Staff oversight that included periodic reviews at midlevel and senior service colleges to assess the quality
of the effort and the inclusion of relevant joint material
in the curriculum at each institution. Clearly American
defenses today are vastly superior to what they were
in 1898, but the need for similar radical change has
arisen again. It is interesting to note that General Peter
Pace, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and Admiral (Ret.) McConnell, Director of National
Intelligence, have both recommended a “GoldwaterNichols” type initiative for the federal government
aimed at unification/integration of the interagency
in counterinsurgency warfare and counterterrorism.
Pace argued that such an effort would improve the
interagency process and allow it to deal better with
the challenges of the “war on terrorism.”133 Several
other studies have independently come to a similar
conclusion.134
Most of the security problems identified by
several commissions and independent studies in
the past 2 decades still exist. The only true change
is that the threat to our security has grown in scale
and complexity. Generally, America still has 20thcentury institutions to counter 21st-century threats.
While the recommendations provided for each of
these three organizations are important, they are
largely agency-specific, that is, directed at preparing a
better Foreign Service officer, a defense policy expert,
and an improved intelligence officer (albeit with an
analytical, operational, or engineering focus). They
will not develop people with the breadth of experience
equipping them to oversee the policy process, assist
in detailed planning, and provide necessary oversight
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during execution. Dr. John Gaddis, the distinguished
political scientist at Yale University, noted the need to
stimulate thinking in terms of “grand strategy,” that
is, the “calculated relationship between means to large
ends.” This is a daunting requirement in many ways.
Thomas Friedman, the respected columnist for the New
York Times, has suggested that long-term strategizing
is like trying to prepare someone now for the Olympic
Games in 10 or 20 years when you do not know what
the events will be.135
The administration of President Bush has acknowledged this problem at various times over the past 2
years and has now begun to address it at this late stage.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report was
delivered in February 2006 as required by Congress
to provide a complete review of where DoD believed
it was and the direction deemed most appropriate in
terms of American strategy and defense investments
for the next 5 years. The QDR clearly proposed efforts
to expand the capacity of agency partners, increase
coordination between combatant commands and
interagency partners, and undertake several initiatives
to improve unity of effort for complex operations
abroad.136 It further supported providing increased
funding for the Department of State’s Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS), the redirection of
resources to other agencies as required, and expanded
training programs for planners in other agencies of the
federal government.
DoD subsequently began a dialogue with other
agencies commencing with the establishment of a
Task Force on National Security Officer Competencies.
This group, which met at the National Defense
University, included representatives from many
executive agencies. The task force derived a set of
prerequisite competencies in knowledge, qualities,
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attributes, and skills applicable to mid-grade and
senior leaders working in the interagency. It provided
these to all executive agencies to be used for position
descriptions and curriculum development, but the
report acknowledged that each agency would apply
these in addition to its own functional requirements
and in different ways.
In May 2007 President Bush expanded on this
effort with an executive order for “National Security
Professional Development.” This order clearly states
that it is the policy of the United States to “promote
education, training, and experience of current and
future professionals in national security positions
in executive departments and agencies.”137 This
order was followed in July 2007 by issuance of the
“National Strategy for the Development of Security
Professionals.” The document set forth draft curricula
learning areas and draft specialty tracks, named
a steering committee, and established a National
Security Education Consortium (NSEC) that would
“prepare civilians and military national security
professionals to evaluate national security challenges
through multidisciplinary education and research
programs, professional exchanges, and outreach.”138
The document also contained important proposals for
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to ensure
that those participating in development activities are
properly selected and rewarded in terms of promotion
and subsequent assignment consideration.
Many observers argued that this “strategy” was
“too little and too late.” Though it calls for coordination
and cooperation among the various executive agencies,
the Interim Director for NSEC has few position
powers, and, at this writing, neither he nor any staff
has been selected. Furthermore, the budget for the
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NSEC remains uncertain. Falling in the final year of the
Bush administration, its long-term future is extremely
problematical and at best cannot begin before early
2008. Some agencies have privately complained that
this document was an “unfunded mandate” calling for
them to expand development opportunities for their
workforce without additional funding.139 Finally, even
prior to release of the document, several leading figures
in Congress expressed concerns about its approach.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike
Skelton, a longtime advocate of professional military
education, sent a letter in April 2006 to then Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld regarding this proposal.
Congressman Skelton, after applauding the QDR’s
call for expanding national security educational
opportunities and affirming the benefits that would
hopefully ensue from such interagency cooperation,
cautioned that any move tending to drain dollars from
military education should be avoided “at all costs.”140
Furthermore, not unlike the military in the late 19th
century and during the Cold War, the organizational
culture of these agencies is such that dramatic internal
reform is unlikely. Even if reform were to occur within
the individual agencies, it would achieve uneven
success among them and fail to advance the ultimate
goal—better policy. What is needed is legislation that
establishes within the Executive Branch of government
a National Security Professional Corps (NSPC) of
policy experts with broad-based experience throughout
the policy process. It should seek to develop, through
attractive, carefully tailored career paths, senior
departmental managers and strategic leaders skilled at
producing integrative, innovative solutions to national
security policy problems.141
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The present monograh has of course focused on
State, OSD, and the CIA. The demands of our strategic
environment, however, require that other agencies
(i.e., Homeland Security, Treasury, Commerce, and
Justice) be included in any interagency reform as they
are all essential to interagency policymaking for this
new era. The NSPC should be reserved expressly for
those in policy career fields as opposed to those in
such technical fields as human resource management,
finance, etc. This latter group requires an important
but different developmental pattern. Such an approach
must also allow for the progression of those who are
interested in focusing their career path on a narrower
aspect of strategic policy, realizing that they will not be
promoted to senior executive positions.
The career path for an individual in the NSPC will
proceed through three developmental levels—entry,
intermediate/management, and senior/leadership.
Launching the NSPC successfully requires three initial
steps. First, the President must clearly articulate (as
have several previous studies) that the nation faces a
crisis in attracting the very best in future generations of
Americans to government service. This “call to arms”
should be not unlike that of President John Kennedy in
his much quoted inaugural address of 1961—“Ask not
what. . . .” A change of this magnitude in the structure
of the Executive Branch now and into the future cannot
occur without robust presidential leadership. So far
at least, President Bush has eschewed issuing such a
clarion call despite the fact that many senior leaders
in his administration have appeared to be advocates
for such an undertaking. Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates, during a commencement address at the College
of William and Mary, observed:
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It is precisely during these trying times that
America needs its best and brightest young
people, from all walks of life, to step forward
and commit to public service. Because while the
obligations of citizenship in any democracy are
considerable, they are even more profound, and
more demanding, as citizens of a nation with
America’s global challenges and responsibilities—
and America’s values and aspirations.142

Second, the presidential call to arms must be
accompanied by more robust and energetic recruiting
programs. These should include but not be limited
to an increase of the Presidential Fellows Program
that has historically capitalized on the desire of most
young Americans to serve. They should also include
additional incentives such as an expansion of the
National Security Education Act (NSEA) that was
previously discussed. NSEA would not only provide
broad support in colleges and universities for social
sciences, languages, and humanities in return for
government service, but also encourage the expansion
of many graduate schools of public policy that have
atrophied in the aftermath of the Cold War. Third, the
President must underscore his support for such an
effort with a significant increase in the funds available
to government agencies earmarked for personnel
development. At a minimum, this measure must
include a 10-15 percent increase in agency personnel
strength at the GS 11 level and above that will allow a
“float” in order for development courses/experiences
to occur without leaving existing positions vacant.
This measure must by design be directed solely at
expanded professional development, barred from
becoming a covert labor source for other purposes. It
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should also include provision for a percentage of each
agency’s permanent staff to be offered opportunities
for advanced civil schooling at government expense,
not unlike what is done for military officers.
The President should further direct that OPM, in
concert with an expanded personnel management
section in the National Security Council (NSC), have
oversight over agency developmental programs, to
include setting down guidelines where appropriate
and conducting periodic reviews for compliance. Each
agency would retain primary control over the entrylevel course for newly selected personnel. This course
would still largely focus on the particular agency
training program to accomplish the daily functional
tasks inherent in its mission. It would, however, be
appropriate for each new employee to complete a
subcourse on the fundamentals of current U.S. national
security policy and the interagency process. This
subcourse could be presented in a distance education
format to ensure consistency and reduce duplication
in the faculty/staff. Guidelines for the subcourse
curriculum would be provided by the NSC and OPM.
Prior to consideration for promotion to GS 14, or
at approximately the 10-to-12-year mark, all personnel
would undergo a mid-level developmental course.
This course must be a fixed requirement across the
organization and not confined to selected individuals,
thus ensuring that each is given a fair opportunity
to attend. This course would expand understanding
of the parent agency, enhance skills as personnel
assume supervisory responsibilities, and update
understanding by personnel of current security policy
and existing challenges. The Foreign Service Institute,
Joint Intelligence College, CIA University, and the
applicable faculty of the National Defense University
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should form a curriculum committee that ensures
that the mid-level course has the proper balance
between an individual parent agency focus and the
broader interagency focus. Each curricular unit should
culminate with an interagency exercise involving the
entire multi-agency student body.
At this point in their career, each attendee would
elect whether to continue to focus their career path
in their own agency or to volunteer for the National
Security Professional Corps. Those who choose to stay
within their parent agency need not be stigmatized, as
it may offer them certain personal advantages. First,
they would likely be able to complete their Federal
service in the Washington, DC, area. Second, they could
remain focused on a particular region or functional area
that they find rewarding. Upon completion of the midlevel development course, a number could be offered
advanced civil schooling in their area of expertise that
further qualifies them for positions in their agency. The
primary adverse effect of this choice is that they would
likely advance no farther than GS 15 or equivalent.
Some exceptions might be made for Foreign Service
Officers who aspire to ambassador positions.
Those who choose to apply for the NSPC would be
screened carefully, possibly to include an examination
or interview, to ensure the selection of the best possible
candidates. Selections will be made by a board
consisting of representatives from the various agencies,
OPM, and the NSC. Those chosen would undergo an
expanded course on the interagency process, current
threat, etc. Upon completion of this course, they would
be placed in a 2-year rotation assignment with another
government agency or on the National Security
Council Staff. Following this rotation assignment, they
would return to their parent agency and be placed in
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a position requiring substantive as well as managerial
responsibilities. These assignments would be made by
the parent agency human resource office, OPM, and
NSC personnel office working in collaboration. Another
advantage of making the selection for NSPC at this
point in an individual’s career is that it could offer the
opportunity for lateral entry by those from other careers
but with appropriate expertise in a region, functional
area, etc. This option may be critically important if
the trend in government that requires more mid-level
managers and fewer entry positions continues. Figure
1 portrays the NSPC prgram graphically.
Prior to consideration for SES, SIS, or equivalent,
each NSPC member must also complete a senior leadership development experience. This can be attendance
at one of the war colleges, Congressional Fellowship,
etc. This should result in a larger number of NSPC
personnel attending the war colleges than is found
today from their respective agencies. This will have
the ancillary advantage of improving the seminar
dynamics and exercises at these institutions. Personnel
rules must be established making it mandatory for an
individual, once selected for GS 15, to be considered
for senior leadership development. This is to ensure
that the responsibility for personnel management
remains with the organization and not the individual.
Upon completion of the senior leadership development
experience and promotion to SES, these individuals
will be assigned to positions as Senior Officer
Directors, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, or above for
the remainder of their career. Initial consideration for
assignment will be with their parent organization or
the NSC, but final selections will be made by a board
similar to that created for their selection to the NSPC.
Each organization will present its recommendation
for the individual’s assignment during this process.
81

ENTER VIA PMF PROGRAM AS GS9

Figure 1. NSPC Career Progression.
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Additional developmental experiences beyond this
could include assignments as Political Adviser to a
Regional Commander, war college faculty, sabbaticals,
etc. These will serve not only to continue the
development of rising members of the NSPC but also
to ensure the retention of their valuable expertise.
Implementation of the NSPC program must
attend to several important considerations. First,
the program must be phased in over time. Still, the
transition period, grandfatherings, and exceptions to
policy cannot be so extensive as to dilute the effort.
Second, as stipulated above, every effort must be
made to ensure that the responsibility and oversight
for career management decisions remain with the
individual agency, OPM, and NSC. Individuals must be
considered for development at the appropriate points
identified in their career. Otherwise they cannot fulfill
the prerequisites for promotion consideration and will
be unfairly punished. Third, a reduction must be made
in the number of Schedule C political appointees in the
agencies affected to make room for the NSPC members
being generated. This action must ensure that an
NSPC member is assigned to most Deputy Assistant
Secretary positions and some at the Assistant Secretary
level. This will have the concomitant advantage of
easing the change from one administration to another.
Finally, implementation of this proposal will not only
require strong Presidential leadership (as previously
emphasized) but also congressional legislation.
Clearly, the track record of implementing sound
recommendations of previous studies demonstrates
that the Executive Branch on its own is incapable of
the type of reform required to overcome bureaucratic
inertia and alter the organizational culture of federal
departments and agencies.143 It is essential that
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Congress be as aggressive in this area of reform as it
was in the adoption of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The other teams could make trouble for us if they
win. . . .
—Yogi Berra

In the follow-on to the attacks of 9/11, the
Commission on Post- Conflict reported that American
security institutions required change to stay abreast of
the current conditions. The report stated:
U.S. institutions and ways of doing business
have not kept pace with the rapidly changing
environment since the end of the Cold War.
Despite over a decade of . . . experience in trying
to address the challenges of failed states and
rebuilding countries following conflicts, U.S.
capacity for addressing these challenges remains
woefully inadequate.144

In many ways America in the 21st century is more
threatened by the failure of states than it is by an imminent attack or invasion by a foreign power. Regardless of how conditions ultimately play out in Iraq, that
trauma may be viewed in retrospect not as the end, but
rather the beginning. Furthermore, failure to achieve
our goals in Iraq would not be the worst possible
outcome. The worst would be failing in the pursuit of
our objectives in Iraq plus failing to learn the important
lessons on how to alter our existing governmental
structures and personnel development systems for
the future. The sad fact is that the U.S. Government
today does not have a deliberate development process
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(beyond what is offered by individual agencies and
departments) that provides a sufficient number of
credible, competent civilian national security officers
capable of conducting strategic planning, policy
formulation, and operational oversight for complex
contingencies.145 Currently, the departments and
agencies of the Executive Branch have neither the
capacity nor capability to produce/obtain such officers,
and there are few, if any, incentives for career civil
servants to pursue the type of interagency development
required to become such officers.
Consequently, the new security environment
has changed the relationship between training and
education in ways that must be considered when
determining an effective way to develop and educate
civilian policymakers for the future. First, today’s
junior official is much more likely to be confronted by
decisions that may have operational or even strategic
consequence than were his Cold War predecessors.
Today’s missions in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo,
and now Iraq and Afghanistan are more politically and
culturally complex than Cold War missions. Second,
while the students of policy in the 1980s could grasp
the essence of American national security strategy
with an understanding of deterrence and containment,
the same is certainly not true today. No catchwords
or pithy slogans can adequately convey the complex
nature of the international environment we confront.
Today’s senior policymaker must have a much more
sophisticated understanding of the integration of all of
the elements of national power (military, diplomatic,
economic, and informational) in the pursuit of national
objectives. General John Abizaid, former commander
of U.S. Central Command, noted this reality prior to
his retirement from active duty. He commented in
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the New York Times that American security structures
for 21st-century defense challenges needed to adapt
and perhaps deemphasize solely military solutions to
many of the problems we face. He argued that America
needed to “figure out how to get economic, diplomatic,
political, and military elements of power synchronized
and coordinated against specific problems wherever
they exist.”146
Accordingly, we must consider how we educate
and develop senior leaders to deal with this level of
complexity. In reality, by the time a person achieves
a senior government position, he/she needs to have
achieved some understanding of grand strategy and
the full integration of the nation’s military, economic,
and diplomatic/political instruments of power. This
need requires us to look at the relationship between
“training” and “education” in a different way.
Traditional issues associated with American culture
may compound shortcomings in our current model for
developing future leaders. For example, America as
a nation has long had an “engineering approach” to
problem solving. When Americans consider their great
accomplishments as a nation, they typically reflect on
the Wright brothers, building the transcontinental
railroad, digging the Panama Canal, or landing the first
man on the Moon. It is a traditional cultural assumption
among Americans that the existence of a problem
presupposes the existence of a solution, usually a
scientific, engineering, or technological solution. Most
Americans would find the story of Alexander the
Great and his solution to cutting the Gordian knot
quite satisfying. Gordius, the legendary founder of the
capital of Phrygia in Asia Minor, dedicated a cart to
Zeus. An oracle declared that whoever could untie the
intricate knot on the yoke of the cart would be the ruler
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of all Asia. Many attempted this feat and failed. After
capturing the city, Alexander is said to have considered
the problem, and with one swipe of his blade across
the knot, solved the problem that had vexed so many.
In a similar fashion, Americans tend to take a direct,
quantitative, no-nonsense attitude toward problem
solving. All it requires, in the American view, is a
rational approach; measurement of the required amount
of resources, people, and time; and the application of
those resources as necessary. Then, voila!
Otto von Bismarck, however, once remarked that
there are two things that you never wish to observe
being made—”sausage and diplomacy.” One of the
differences between strategic/diplomatic problems
and tactical/operational problems is that the latter do
have solutions, or at least finality. But diplomatic and
strategic problems (like those we currently confront)
frequently do not. Many budding American strategists
and policymakers find this lack of closure extremely
frustrating. They are further disturbed that their choices
may be confined to the least bad of several bad options.
Furthermore, rather than finding an actual “solution,”
they often must accept that though they can make the
problem better or worse, a final solution is unlikely, at
least on their watch.
As previously suggested, any possible “success”
in a peace support operation, complex crisis such as
Kosovo, or post-conflict resolution in Iraq requires
an integrated approach that combines the military,
economic, political, and social elements of power
of the nation. Also as noted earlier, the military has
frequently been put in charge of these operations
by default and attempted to coordinate the efforts
of numerous government and nongovernment
organizations. Although the military may accomplish
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its own tasks effectively, it often finds itself stuck in a
complex and ambiguous situation in which it has little
power or influence to accomplish other, oftentimes
more complex, tasks that defy solutions based on the
application of force or violence.147 The military portion
of the solution may in fact be the easiest to accomplish
and must proceed apace if the political, economic,
and social efforts are themselves to have any hope of
success.
Not surprisingly, military leaders having wide
experience with the Iraq and Afghanistan issues have
been some of the most vocal in calling for change.
This group has included General Peter Pace, former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and now, Defense
Secretary Gates. Some of these leaders have even
opined that in the sequel to 9/11, 2001, the Department
of State, DoD, and CIA went off to war while most of
the remainder of the federal government and American
public continued as if there had been no real change
save for the inconvenience of added security measures
during check-in at air terminals. It has further been
reported that members of the JCS told President
Bush and Defense Secretary Gates at one point that
the surge strategy announced by the President in
January 2007 could fail unless more civilian agencies
stepped forward to carry out plans for reconstruction
and political/economic development.148 General
George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army and formerly
commander of all American forces in Iraq, observed
that “the question really is can we change the culture
in the other departments so their folks can participate
in areas like Iraq, or whether that’s simply too hard
and the mission should fall to the military.”149
If American strategy is to deal with challenges
like Iraq and Afghanistan in the future, it must not
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only alter existing culture in federal agencies but
also carefully address the current mismatch between
strategic objectives and resources. Lieutenant General
Peter Chiarelli, former commander of the MultiNational Corps in Iraq, describes this “capabilities
gap” as not being the fault of any military service or
civilian agency but rather the result of “our government
not having clearly defined expectations of what each
instrument of national power should provide to our
foreign policy solutions.”150 The nation must decide
on three alternatives: (1) ignore the problem of failed
states in the future; (2) depend primarily on the military
and DoD to resolve the problem of failed states; or (3)
expand the capacity and capability of the Executive
Branch agencies to shoulder their functional share
of solutions. Clearly, ignoring the plight of failing
states, particularly in areas that are vital to American
national security such as the Middle East, is suicidal.
Furthermore, our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan
suggest that giving this mission solely to the military
is problematical absent a radical expansion of the
military’s nonmilitary roles and capabilities. It also
places America at great risk if similar contingencies
arise around the globe in the near time frame that
further stress the capacities of our interagency.
For that reason, 21st-century civilian agencies and
policymakers must be developed to deal with more
shades of gray than the clearer black and white options
of the Cold War. Our strategic challenges may be more
like Rome’s of 2,000 years ago than like our own of just
20 years ago.
The Romans did not face a single enemy, or even
a fixed group of enemies, whose ultimate defeat
would ensure permanent security. Regardless of
the amplitude of Roman victories, the frontiers of
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the empire would always remain under attack,
since they were barriers in the path of secular
migration flows from north to south and from
east to west. Hence Roman strategy could not
usefully aim at total victory at any cost, for the
threat was not temporary but endless. The only
rational goal was the maintenance of a minimally
adequate level of security at the lowest feasible
cost to society.151

If the Roman experience serves as a foreshadowing
of America’s potential future—and the parallels are
suggestive—than the time to undertake change is now.
The proposals in this monograph call for organizational
realignment that integrates human capital strategies
into the core practices of the interagency and the federal
government as a whole. The goal is not only better-run
agencies but also better policy.
Large portions of American industry have already
made parallel determinations in their own operations.
Corporate America has realized that the “learning
organization” requires organizational education
in addition to traditional training. Learning is a set
of processes and structures to help people create
new knowledge, share their understanding, and
continuously improve themselves and the results of
their enterprises. It is not so much a program as it is
an open-ended philosophy that the leadership of the
organization institutionalizes permanently.152
Great leaders have adopted such an approach
intuitionally throughout history. For example, General
(and later Secretary of State) George Marshall once
observed:
It became clear to me at age 58. I would have
to learn new tricks that were not taught in the
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military manuals or on the battlefield. In this
position I am a political soldier and will have to
put my training in rapping out orders and making
snap decisions on the back burner, and have to
learn the new arts of persuasion and guile. I must
become an expert in a whole new set of skills.

Marshall clearly made the transition for himself and
then effected change throughout the government. But
he had the advantage of time and the less demanding
environment of the interwar period. Our challenge
today is to embed a true developmental system so that
the next generation of policymakers is prepared for a
future we can only see darkly. Furthermore, we must
accomplish such preparation for the future even as we
contend with successive crises du jour.
Such thoughts underscore the emerging reality that
continuous learning by successful adults is difficult but
essential to modern organizations and governments.
Our current national security leadership must
distinguish between two fundamental perspectives—
both essential but very different. The first is the
“Operating Perspective,” characterized by short
time horizons, priority of action over reflection, high
energy consumption, and high day-to-day operational
efficiency. This perspective encompasses many of
the internal recommendations made with respect to
each organization in the present study. The second
is the “Building Perspective.” Its time horizons are
measured in months or decades. It requires analysis
of the organization at the macro level instead of the
workaday micro level. It seeks outcomes that may not
be evident for years. But it is essential for sustaining
the organization into the future.153 It requires the
development of people as well as ideas and policies.
The American national security process must be able to
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do both forms of development if we are to successfully
manage the war on terrorism and manage the enormous
change the evolving international security situation
demands. We have little time to delay. America’s
failure to achieve its objectives in Iraq may not be the
worst outcome that we potentially face. Failure in
Iraq and our unwillingness or inability to learn from
this experience and thereby adapt our government to
future strategic challenges would be even worse.
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